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 ABSTRACT 
Event studies are widely used in finance and business research. The study involves 
identifying an event of interest, analysing the abnormal stock return and testing the 
significance of the event. This research assesses the change to a company’s stock 
value after an announcement of a collusive engagement. The study adopts an 
empirical approach by means of an event study analysis to determine the magnitude of 
the valuation change as well as other statistical methods to define the statistical 
significance of the valuation variation. The research also seeks to identify if the 
valuation change will always be negative, given the negativity associated with the 
collusive announcement.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
This chapter acts as an introductory blue print of the proposed research. The context of the study 
highlights the importance of corporate reputation to a firm’s intangible equity and the need to 
assess the quantum thereof. This concept is further elaborated in the explanation of the collusive 
construction environment in South Africa, and the degree to which the Competition Commission 
went to exploit the price fixing underworld.  The research problem is identified as the connection 
between quantifying the magnitude of collusive announcements and possible reputational 
damage.  
The objectives of the study are to establish a link between collusive announcements and the 
impact on corporate brand, whilst also assessing what the effect is on the market returns given 
the negative publicity. Finally, the earnings will then be examined before, and after, the 
announcement for additional assessment.  
The significance of the study will provide benefit to all major stakeholders in the industry through 
risk management and system restructuring. A greater understanding of the problem at hand 
could possibly invoke regulatory change.  
This chapter formerly introduces the thesis and is organised as follows. Section 1.2 presents the 
background to the study. Section 1.3 discusses the research problem. Section 1.4 discusses 
presents the research objectives. Section 1.5 presents research questions. Section 1.6 
concludes the chapter by discussing the significance of the study.  
1.1 Context of the Study 
Literature suggests that while corporate reputations have enjoyed far more scrutiny over recent 
time, the topic still tends to remain largely understudied. One of the explanations for this may be 
due to the fact that corporate reputations are often hardly noticed until they are threatened, at 
which point the issue takes on greater significance. Barnett, Jermier and Lafferty (2006) sought 
to consolidate the shortage of studies on corporate reputation into a precise and commonly 
agreed upon definition of the term, which was stated as follows: 
“Observers’ collective judgements of a corporation based on assessments of the financial, social 
and environmental impacts attributed to the corporation over time.”(Barnett, Jermier, & Lafferty, 
2006)  
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Inherent and implied in this definition, are the concepts of corporate identity, image and 
reputational capital.  Accordingly, a particular event may trigger observers to pass judgement 
about a firm in relation to more visible actions or mistakes. Reputational capital therefore ebbs 
and flows over time in parallel with the amount of judgements the firm receives, and it is often 
this economic and intangible asset, which is attributed to reputation.    
Organisations have in recent years recognized the importance of corporate reputation as a 
means of achieving business goals and competitive rivalry. The proliferation of information and 
media coverage over the past two decades further fuels investor’s demands for increased 
transparency within organisations. The growing attention waged against the need for social 
responsibility and weeding out corruption, all leads towards organisations building and 
maintaining strong reputations (Argenti & Druckenmiller, 2004). It would appear that while much 
effort and research has been put into the development of measures and tools to capture the 
essence of intangible brand equity, less focus has been directed towards company brand equity 
or corporate equity, which are determined by corporate reputation. A rather startling fact, when 
one considers that in the USA, Executives consider corporate reputation to be one of the most 
substantial drivers of success (Schwaiger, 2004). The identification and conversion of corporate 
reputation (intangible) into corporate equity (tangible) is limited, but would prove to be extremely 
valuable to organisations wishing to exploit the competitive edge or, conversely, assess the 
adverse repercussions of a particular event.  
Further studies have shown that investors and consumers place more emphasis on ‘umbrella 
brands’ rather than individual product offerings, despite the abundance of information availability. 
Investors may be uncertain about product attributes and therefore may place more emphasis on 
the brand image which means that there is a greater reliance on the corporate brand attributes 
rather than individual product offering (Anand & Shachar, 1999). Organisations should therefore 
embrace these concepts of brand management in order to avoid investment depletion and 
reputation capital damage. 
In recent times, the word ‘collusion’ has been synonymously associated with the South African 
construction industry. Prominent construction firms in the Republic have quickly learned how a 
damaged reputation can negatively impact customer loyalty and threaten the company’s 
economic well-being. Confidence in the industry is low and public scrutiny remains high but the 
quantum of the damage, attributable to reputational capital, remains to be seen. The construction 
sector is however not the only industry to have faced allegations of collusion. Both the 
pharmaceutical and food industries were also targeted by the competition commission and were 
made to pay.   
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The competition commission is a statutory body constituted by Government of South Africa 
empowered to investigate and control restrictive business practices, abuse of dominant positions 
and mergers in order to achieve equity and efficiency in the South African economy. Part of the 
commission’s role is to police anti-competitive and collusive behaviour by corporations within the 
republic, including the more recent enquiry into the South African construction industry, and 
amongst others, the pharmaceutical industry and the food and beverage sector.  
The enquiry into the construction sector resulted in the declaration of fifteen companies  
involvement in collusive practices in the years leading up to the 2010 soccer world cup. The 
admission of guilt, known as a consent agreement, from the aforesaid companies, earned them 
leniency from the Competition Commission thereby reducing the penalties to be paid. This fast 
track settlement process required all guilty parties to disclose any and all involvement in anti-
competitive behaviour such as bid-rigging and cover pricing after the investigation process had 
been completed. As such, a combined financial settlement value of R1.46bn was subsequently 
imposed on the offenders with mutually agreeable payment terms agreed upon (Competition 
Tribunal 2013). These penalties took into account the organisations involvement in the number of 
projects and constituted a percentage of the company’s annual turnover. A statement issued by 
the Minister of Economic Development revealed that the companies had been sufficiently 
“scared” by the intervention of the commission and that the Government did not foresee any 
more collusive behaviour by them (Benjamin, 2013).  
Similarly in 2010, the food and beverage industry was rocked by allegations of a bread cartel 
operating in the Western Cape Province of South Africa. The competition tribunal launched a 
preliminary investigation into the matter and initiated complaints toward Tiger Brands, Premier 
Foods and Pioneer Foods all of whom were allegedly involved in the cartel. Premier foods 
applied for leniency during the course of the trial in exchange for full disclosure of detail relating 
to the collusion. It was later disclosed that Tiger Brands and Pioneer Foods were found guilty of 
fixing the selling prices and other trading conditions, contrary to competitive spirit. Premier Foods 
also revealed that the bread cartel had made agreements into the division of markets by dividing 
the territories they operated in.   
 Furthermore in 2008, the Competition Commission alleged that four respondents in the South 
African pharmaceutical industry contravened the competition act by dividing the private hospital 
industry (Competition Commision and Adcock Ingram, 2008). The respondents, namely, Adcock 
Ingram Critical Care (PTY) LTD; Dismed Criticare (PTY) LTD; Thusanhong Healthcare (PTY) 
LTD and Tiger Brands Limited conceded to fixing bids for the supply of products to the State 
tender system where medicines were supplied to hospitals and healthcare services. The 
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competition tribunal concluded that the conduct of the companies was designed to evade 
competition between the colluding firms and manipulate prices for the pharmaceutical and 
hospital products (Africa, 2014). It was the courts findings that the respondent’s had engaged in 
meetings to discuss their collaborative responses to government tenders and agreed their prices 
prior to tender submission. Adcock Ingram Critical Care were required to pay an administrative 
penalty of eight percent of its earnings, year ending 2007, to a value of approximately R53 million 
(Competition Commision and Adcock Ingram, 2008). 
However, it remains to be seen as to what indirect damages can be attributed the collusive 
behaviour over and above the tangible financial penalties paid over proceeding years. The 
quantification of intangible consequences such as reputational damage due to improper business 
practice is limited (Perry & De Fontnouvelle, 2005). The linkage between collusion and wealth 
losses are not clearly understood. The purpose of this research is to address the knowledge gap 
by examining the stock price reaction of the offending firms and the markets to reaction to a 
major announcement affecting operational losses.   
1.2 Problem Statement 
Preceding research studies appear to have focused more on the direct costs associated with 
allegations of price fixing, than on any other forms of damage (Cummins, Lewis and Wei, 2004; 
Perry & De Fontnouvelle, 2005) . Direct costs usually encompass fines, legal actions, restitution 
of damage and so forth.  Whilst a number of research papers have studied the shareholder 
wealth effects of criminal allegations against corporations and found significant market-imposed 
costs on shareholders as a result (Baucus & Baucus, 1997; Davidson & Worrel, 1988). However, 
it would appear that the linkage between allegations of corporate crime and wealth losses is still 
not clearly understood. To this end, the impact of collusive announcements on a firm’s reputation 
must be investigated to reduce the knowledge gap. The connection is examined through the 
stock price reaction of firms to allegations of collusive activities using an event study 
methodology.  
1.3 Research Objectives 
The objectives of this study are stated as follows: 
 To investigate the impact of a collusive announcement on the brand and reputation of 
the company by means of a literature review. 
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 To determine if there is a statistically significant change in the stock valuation after a 
Stock Exchange News Service (SENS) announcement of collusion.  
 Assuming there is a valuation change, to then assess if this variation has a positive or 
negative impact on the firm’s stock price.  
1.4 Hypothesis of the study 
In order to meet the objectives as stated under section 1.3, the study hypothesizes the following: 
i. A firm’s market value will be significantly affected whenever collusive announcements are 
published. 
ii. The valuation change to the stock price will always be negative.   
1.5 Significance of the Study 
Corporate reputation is a ‘soft concept’. It refers to the collective judgement of observers’, 
including shareholders, both internal and external, in accordance with their observations and 
experiences in dealing with the corporation over time. Many organisations tend to focus their 
energy on resolving ‘day to day’ activities which are predominately easier to manage due to their 
familiarity with these activities. The technical analysis of this form of risk management forms the 
cornerstone of corporate governance and also takes the first step toward a better understanding 
of corporate worth stimulated via intangible concepts.  
Over time, most organisations have developed risk assessment and management guidelines for 
addressing a wide range of areas, yet most appeared to have ignored the concept of reputational 
risk. The definition and measurement of intangible assets like brand equity and intellectual capital 
are hard to assess yet much market value can be derived from them. Organizations are 
especially vulnerable to anything that damages their reputations. This reputational damage can 
easily drive loyal customers to alternate products or services. Reputational damage also 
negatively effects future growth of the organisation, price-earnings multiples, market values and 
cost of capital (Eccles, Newquist, & Schatz, 2007).  
The aim of this research is to investigate factors which contribute to firms participating in anti-
competitive behaviour and connect the repercussions of this behaviour to a tangible change in 
stock value. Identifying and isolating the magnitude between operational losses and reputational 
damage remains largely unchartered (Perry & De Fontnouvelle, 2005). This research seeks to 
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narrow that knowledge gap by associating an abnormal change in firm’s stock return to  a 
corresponding announcement.  
Corporate stakeholders such as regulatory authorities, contractors, consultants and shareholders 
stand to benefit from the research through the proactive management of reputational risk. Proper 
quantification and assessment of an event provides perspective to all stakeholders involved, 
which in turn allows process re-evaluation of risk management and the mitigation of potential 
threats. 
Ethical issues aside, from a shareholders point of view, illegal acts may be worthwhile if their 
expected benefits outweigh their expected costs (Davidson & Worrel, 1988). This research seeks 
to investigate the legitimacy of the statement.  
1.6 Organization of the Research Report 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the study in the context of the knowledge gap in the research 
and the objectives of the study to gain further insight. Chapter 2 explores the available literature 
and key themes of relevance in the field of the chosen research. The review explores similar 
events and previous research which underlines the core identity of the study. Chapter 3 
describes the intended tools and techniques to be used toward achieving the research 
objectives. Chapter 4 presents the results of the statistical analysis to each event. Chapter 5 
discusses the results and offers possible insight into some of the outcomes. Chapter 6 discusses 
the recommendations and conclusions of the study as well as offering insight into additional 
research in the field.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter contains a literature review on the key themes of relevance to the study. The focus 
of this review is to identify the elements of collusion and the macroeconomic reasoning causing 
firms to engage in anti-competitive behaviour. The objective of the review will be to establish a 
link between collusion and reputational damage to the organisation. The chapter is organised as 
follows: section 2.1 presents an introductory explanation of the overall chapter. Section 2.2 
comprises corporate brand and reputational review of literature applicable to the study whilst 
section 2.3 explores the economics behind anti-trust behaviour. Section 2.4 covers factors 
associated with reputational risk which leads into the review of the efficient market hypothesis in 
section 2.5. The review ends off by investigating the investor’s reaction in section 2.6, followed 
by a chapter summary in section 2.7.  
Although collusion is a widespread phenomenon, there is surprisingly very little literature that is 
directly applicable to collusion in the construction sector. For this reason, similarities will have to 
be drawn from international case studies across similar events. The corporate reputational 
literature reviewed suggests that a firms’ reputational impact should be assessed using an event 
study as the primary methodology (Gillet et al., 2010; Perry & De Fontnouvelle, 2005; Sinanaj & 
Muntermann, 2013). The authors find evidence that when a firm has suffered an operational loss, 
the impact of the stock market value exceeds that of the loss itself thus implying that the 
difference is attributable to reputational damage. This paper aims to explore this aspect of  
research, including the premise that potential reputational damage would have been caused by 
collusive and anti-competitive announcements.   
2.1 Corporate Brand and Reputation 
There is evidence that the disclosure of fraudulent activity or improper business practices at a 
company may serve to damage the firm’s reputation, and drive away shareholders and 
customers. In a study of 292 US companies, Fombrun and Stanley (1990), found empirical 
evidence that companies reputations are constructed by observer’s based on information about a 
firms' relative structural position by “specifically using market and accounting signals indicating 
performance, institutional signals indicating conformity to social norms, and strategy signals 
indicating strategic postures” (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). 
While the concept of reputational risk has been studied and written about at length in both 
academic and financial literature, direct evidence of reputational losses at financial organisation’s  
has received far less attention (Cummins, Lewis and Wei, 2004). In a study, (Perry & De 
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Fontnouvelle, 2005), assessed the impact of operational loss announcements on the market 
value of financial institutions by examining a firm’s stock price reaction to the announcement of a 
major operational loss event and found that losses derived from internal fraud events were 
interpreted as reputational damage, if the magnitude of the stock value exceeded the loss 
percentage. Thus, a decline in the firm’s market value which exceeds the announcement loss 
amount was interpreted as reputational loss (Perry & De Fontnouvelle, 2005).  
(Gillet, Hübner, & Plunus, 2010) build upon this method of reputational quantification using event 
studies to estimate the magnitude of an operational loss in the banking institutions. A research 
paper by (Sinanaj & Muntermann, 2013) also apply similar methodologies to assess the extent of 
reputational damages caused by data breaches in the information technology sector and found 
that newly published data breaches have a negative effect on the firms value.  
2.2 Anti-Trust Law and Economics 
Economics is the science of choice (Myers, 2013). In the world of economics, this implies that 
people should make careful choices about what is made, how it is made, for whom it will be 
made. In terms of construction these choices relate to the types of investments made, what and 
how it is constructed and on whose behalf? Myers (2013) postulates that at any given stage 
there are an infinite amount of wants yet the world’s resources can only accommodate a finite set 
of needs. Construction economics, as well as its mainstream equivalent, is concerned with the 
allocation of these scarce resources (Myers, 2013).  
The reasons warranting construction’s own specialised set of economics are generally attributed 
to the sheer size of the industry and the profound contribution to the country’s GDP. Myers 
describes the distinct qualities of the industry as follows (Myers, 2013):  
 The demand for activity in construction is determined by the general health of the 
economy as a whole. 
 The method of price determination is unusually complex due to the tendering process 
used at various stages. 
 Most projects are unique and can be considered as ‘once-off’. 
 The physical nature of the project is very large, heavy and expensive.  
 Firms in the construction industry are price takers and not price makers.  
These sentiments are further correlated in research conducted by (Eckbo, 1983) where he tests 
the hypothesis that horizontal mergers generate positive abnormal returns to stockholders of 
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bidder firms and will subsequently increase the profitability of rival colluding firms. Assuming the 
collusion hypothesis hold true, the rivals of the merging firms benefit from the merger through the 
reduction of competition, lowering of production cost and ultimately increasing the price of the 
goods provided. Further evidence suggests that colluding firms stand to gain additional benefit if 
the merging firms are investigated for allegations of anti-trust laws.  
It is postulated by (Eckbo, 1983) that the traditional collusion argument presumes that the 
incentive to co-ordinate production with rival firms is a function of the costs of monitoring the 
collusive agreement. These costs can be decreased by reducing the number of players in the 
market therefore reducing the amount of observation needed. There is therefore a higher 
probability of detecting of detecting cheating members in the cartel. If this scenario holds true, 
the cartel stands to make consistent short run gains in profit.   
2.2.1 Game Theory 
These aforementioned qualities are further engrained by Brockman (2009) example of collusive 
behaviour where he provides analysis using Taylor’s game theory, under the assumption of a 
duopolistic condition where: 
“Two companies called Bageldum and Bageldee produce rather homogenous products, bagels. 
They have a choice of charging the competitive price where they will earn no economic profit as 
marginal cost equals price or they could collude, charge the monopoly price and make a profit of 
$2 million each. There is also an incentive to defect from the collusion by undercutting the 
monopoly price just slightly (thus becoming competitive with a price above marginal cost) and by 
selling a large volume of bagels with a comfortable profit ($4 million in the example). The other 
company then will make a loss equal to fixed cost (-$1 million).(Brockmann, 2009)” 
Brockman goes on to hypothesize two possible scenarios.  The first scenario postulates that the 
incentive to defect is large, leading Bageldum to choose this option. Bageldee therefore has no 
other option but to reduce his price, as he will not continue to receive any business. Thus, the 
game is repeated over and over leading both firms to arrive at a competitive price in the long run 
equilibrium.  
The second scenario follows on from the first by stating that Bageldum and Bageldee will sooner 
or later realise the unsustainable effects of competitive pricing and therefore collude again to 
charge the monopoly price. If the game is repeated often enough, there will not be any need for 
the players to engage in explicit collusion. Brockman (2009) concludes that by virtue of both 
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companies understanding the mechanics of collusion, there will be a convergence to the 
monopoly price via tacit collusion, which is not illegal. The results of monopoly pricing are that 
quantities are supplied below equilibrium and prices are charged above equilibrium (Varian & 
Repcheck, 2010).   
2.2.2 Market Structure  
“Collusive tendering is a prohibited practice in which rivals inflate prices in markets where the 
customer acquires goods or services through soliciting tenders”,(Khumalo, Nqojela, & Njisane, 
2013).  Organisations, both public and private, rely on a competitive bidding process to achieve 
this end. However, the competitive process only works, when prices are set independently and 
honestly by the various competitors. When competitors collude, prices are inflated and ultimately 
the customer is cheated. Price fixing, bid rigging, and other forms of collusion are illegal and are 
subject to criminal prosecution by the Competition Commission in South Africa. 
Brockman (2009) categorizes construction into three different levels of market structure: 
 Macro-level or national construction market: In all capitalist countries the number of 
construction companies competing for jobs is very large. Construction investment is high 
and the average job size is small relative to the overall investment. The market is in 
perfect competition.  
 Mezzo-level or regional construction market: Usually, depending on the business cycle, 
both supply and demand are characterized by a large number of players. The market is in 
perfect competition, except for a few abnormalities. 
 Micro-level or construction project market: The structure depends on the choice of the 
client (demand side). 
Competitive markets on the macro- and mezzo-level prevent each single construction company 
of having an influence on quantity or price; they act as quantity and price takers. Therefore, an 
argument can be made that there are strong incentives for contractors to collude, as long run 
economic survival is at stake. The question remains as to how this can be avoided.  
2.3 Reputational Risk  
It may be postulated that companies of sound standing and a positive reputation are more likely 
to attract higher calibre staff. Most often because they are perceived to provide higher value 
services and goods, which in turn enables them to charge a premium. The market in turn, 
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perceives that such companies will deliver sustained earnings, and as a result, they have higher 
price-earnings multiples, market values and lower costs of capital (Eccles et al., 2007).  
Reputational risk is defined by (Sturm, 2013), as “the risk arising from a negative perception on 
the part of customers, shareholders, counterparties, investors, debt holders, market analysts, 
regulators and other relevant parties that can adversely affect the firm’s ability to maintain 
existing, or establish new, business relationships and continued access to sources of funding” 
(Sturm, 2013). 
Reputational risk is however classified as an intangible asset and is becoming increasingly 
difficult to manage, notwithstanding its importance and the risks associated with inadequate 
management.  
2.3.1 The Rise of Intangible Assets  
Business risk auditing (BRA) has become the accounting audit risk benchmark since the concept 
was developed in the 1980’s (Power, 2004). The development and analysis of the practice 
essentially advanced two notable divisions in the model, namely primary and secondary risk 
spheres. The primary risk is the misstatement of financial statements and the secondary risk 
component reflect the risk of financial and reputational losses to the business itself.  
According to Power (2004) reputational risk, which is traditionally thought of in terms of financial 
magnitude, means that even apparently small events or losses, such as a minor regulatory fine, 
can have much larger repercussions. Much depends on the surrounding media, legal systems 
and social processes as to the degree of amplification to the reputational damage. These 
sentiments are echoed by (Rayner, 2004), where popular primary risk shareholder value 
benchmarks such as EBITDA (earnings before interest taxes amortisation and depreciation) 
have become discredited due to accounting manipulation. Rayner (2004) suggests that a 
blinkered focus on financial parameters can be a recipe for disaster, hence the renewed 
emphasis on secondary risk and intangible assets.  
2.3.2 Drivers and Measurement 
There are many factors that have been found to drive reputational risk and this include  work 
place talent and culture, corporate social responsibility, financial performance and long-term 
investment value, corporate governance and leadership, regulatory compliance, communication 
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and crisis management (Rayner, 2004) etc.  Smutniak (2004) found that the single biggest risk or 
business hazard was reputational risk (Smutniak, 2004). 
Organisations must develop a framework to measure reputational risk, given the trend toward 
favouring the secondary drivers.  
Emphasis is made to the management of reputation as not necessarily keeping ones head below 
the parapet, but also exploiting these factors to produce positive light on the company.  The final 
conclusion of the review is that reputational risk is defined as any action, event or circumstance 
that could adversely or beneficially affect an organisations reputation.  
Corporate governance is identified as one of the drivers affecting an organisations reputation. 
This specifically refers to compliance with laws and regulations, the personal integrity of directors 
and the transparency of reporting and communications. Rayner’s summation of key drivers are 
supported by research conducted by (Gaultier-Gaillard & Louisot, 2006) where a relatively small 
survey was conducted amongst 20 organisations to ascertain their feedback of key drivers 
affecting reputational risk. Their findings concluded that 83 percent of the respondents 
acknowledged reputation to be a key component in reaching the organisations strategic 
objectives. About 16 percent had a formalized quantification process to monitor and measure a 
company’s reputation, whereas 58 percent chose to use informal information and publications to 
measure it.  
2.4 Market Efficiency  
Event methodology is an appropriate way to determine the valuation effects caused by socially 
irresponsible and responsible actions because it can find very short term, even single day,  
reactions to a particular event (Davidson & Worrel, 1988). Accounting based returns may not 
reflect these reactions until the reports have been prepared and formally issued to the public. By 
this stage, the impact of the event itself may not be discernible due to several other events 
having recorded over a longer period.  
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) (Malkiel & Fama, 1970) has dominated the analysis of 
financial economics for the last four decades. This method has become the gold standard for 
gauging security price reaction to an announcement or an event (Binder, 1998). In practice, 
event studies have been used for two main reasons: 
A. To test the null hypothesis that the market efficiently incorporates all information. 
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B. Under the maintained hypothesis of market efficiency (with respect to information that is 
publically available), to examine the impact of some event on the shareholders and the 
firms wealth. 
EMH states that market prices fully reflect all available information. This hypothesis is rooted in 
the traditional neoclassical economic approach that states that the theory:  
“has been challenged by economists who stress psychological and behavioural elements 
of stock-price determination and by econometricians who argue that stock returns are, to 
a considerable extent, predictable” (Malkiel, 2003). 
Davidson and Worrel, 1988, prescribe that the market model has proven to a worthy predictor of 
normal returns, for studies into irresponsible behaviour and corporate performance (Davidson & 
Worrel, 1988). To this end, the market model is formed by regressing the daily returns of each 
security against a market index. The normal returns are computed for each firm for a period 
before and after the event announcement. The difference between the normal and the actual 
return is then computed as the abnormal return. If investors have received information that 
causes stock prices to rise relative to the market, the average abnormal return and the 
cumulative abnormal return will be positive. The opposite also holds true. Statistical t-tests are 
computed to determine the levels of significance.  
2.4.1 Market Over-Reaction  
J.M. Keynes was one of the first to note market overreaction in day to day fluctuations of profits 
(Keynes, 1937). As did J.B Williams in 1938 where he noted that “prices were based too much 
on the current earning power and too little on the long-term dividend paying power ” (Williams, 
1938, pp. 28, p.19). The term ‘overreaction’ carries with it an implied comparison of ‘reaction’ 
which is considered to be appropriate. A study of market efficiency by (Bondt & Thaler, 1985) 
investigated weather behaviour affects stock prices. Enthusiasts in the field market behaviour 
and individual decision making, conducted research and found that the market tends to 
‘overreact’ to unexpected and dramatic news events, but will correct themselves in the opposite 
direction over time. The results of the study discovered substantial weak form inefficiencies 
which were consistent with overreaction hypothesis. When observed behaviour diverges from the 
predicted model, two hypotheses are suggested; either the model has been incorrectly specified 
or the market is inefficient.  
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In contrast to the idea of efficient models (Kahneman & Tversky, 1977) conducted research into 
the field of intuitive prediction and discovered that people are prone to give insuff icient weight to 
certain types of information such as base-rate (current) frequency of outcomes and their 
predictability. This is consistent with Williams’s statement regarding the current earning power 
and long-term dividend potential, which suggests that investors overweight dramatic news events 
which in turn drive the price of the affected stock too far. This overreaction can create arbitrage 
opportunities since investors can create portfolios with abnormal risk adjusted returns.  
The overreaction hypothesis was tested by the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) in a study 
conducted by (Page & Way, 1992) where their findings produced clear evidence of investor over-
reaction. On average, the returns of a listed portfolio ‘losers’ significantly outperformed the 
‘winners’ over a thirty-six month period by between 10% and 20% for both two year and three 
year formation periods. All of which was significant at a 1% level.  
2.5 Investigation of Investor Reaction  
In a study undertaken by (Perry & De Fontnouvelle, 2005), an analysis was performed and the 
reputational impact assessed of a company’s stock price reaction in relation to an announcement 
of a major loss event. Loss percentages were computed as dollar losses divided by the firm’s 
market capitalization, and a market model was used to determine abnormal returns for each 
organization. The abnormal return for a firm was defined as the difference between the firm’s 
actual return and the expected return based on a one-factor market model. Any decline in a 
firm’s market value that exceeds the announced loss amount is interpreted as a reputational loss. 
What (Perry & De Fontnouvelle, 2005) found, was that there was significant impact of an 
operational loss announcement on the firm’s market value. Further findings also suggested that 
market values fall one-for-one with losses caused by external events, but fall by over twice the 
loss percentage in cases involving internal fraud.  
Cummins, Lewis and Wei (2006) also assessed the market value impact of an operational loss 
announcement by US banks and insurance companies. They found that operational loss 
announcements tend to exert a negative impact on equity values, with insurance stocks suffering 
greater losses than the banks. Cummins et al. (2006) also established a positive relationship, 
which suggested that operational loss announcements tend to have a larger market impact on 
firms with greater growth prospects (Cummins, Lewis, & Wei, 2006).  
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Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004) assessed the market reaction to earnings restatement 
announcements. They found that the average abnormal returns were approximately -9% over a 
20 day window surrounding the announcement. There was also evidence to suggest that 
statements involving fraud tended to have a more negative effect on the market reaction. 
Furthermore, they postulated that investors tended to be more concerned with restatements that 
had a negative effect on management integrity than restatements which were attributed to 
technical accounting issues. Murphy, Shrieves and Tibbs (2009) examined the market impact of 
firms that had allegedly committed acts of misconduct. These acts included antitrust violations, 
fraud bribery and copyright infringements, of which acts of fraud were found to be the most 
detrimental to stock prices. Murphy et al. (2009) also found that the company’s size was 
negatively related to the percentage loss in firm market value and that allegations of misconduct 
were accompanied by increases in the variability of stock returns. In addition to this they 
attributed the influence of the firm’s size on market losses to both the economy of scale effect 
and a reputation effect. With the reputational effect, larger firms with more robust brand power 
were able to reduce the impact of the loss from a damaging announcement.  
2.6 The Impact of Announcements on Returns 
There was significant literary debate in the early 1980’s surrounding the relationship between 
corporate social responsibility and financial performance (Arlow & Gannon, 1982; Cochran, 
Wood, & Jones, 1985). The lack of consensus was attributed to three main methodological 
inconsistencies, namely: i) the use of questionable indices of social responsibility ii) poor 
measure of financial performance and iii) inadequate statistical procedures (Ullmann, 1985). 
(Davidson & Worrel, 1988) addressed these concerns in their study by firstly replacing corporate 
illegalities as a proxy for corporate social responsibility. Secondly, they assessed the financial 
performance via shareholder returns as the preferred medium of performance. They further 
argued that typical accounting-determined profitability measures were inadequate when 
measuring cross-sectional comparisons over industries and time. And lastly, they employed an 
event study as the chosen medium to evaluate the impact of the event against financial returns, 
premised upon the assumption that if the market operates efficiently it will penalize irresponsible 
acts.    
After incorporating these amends into the study, the results showed that the market did react 
negatively to the announcement of corporate illegality, but the reaction was a one-time downward 
adjustment of stock return on the day the news first reached the market, indicating that the timing 
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was not trivial. Their results showed that the market does, at least in the short term, penalize the 
stock price of firms that are caught in socially irresponsible acts.  
Similarly, negative abnormal returns were associated to product recall announcements in the 
automobile industry in previous research. An extension of this research by (Davidson & Worrell, 
1992) found that product recalls and products taken off the market, outside of the automobile 
industry, also had negative abnormal returns but were significantly more negative when products 
were replaced as opposed to being repaired.   
2.6.1 Research Question 1 
i. A firm’s market value will be significantly affected whenever collusive announcements are 
published. 
2.6.2 Research Question 2 
ii. The valuation change to the stock price will always be negative.    
The research instruments necessary to answer these questions is further elaborated on in 
Chapter 3.   
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Event study analysis is a statistical method used to evaluate the relevance of a particular event 
on firms’ future prospects by examining its impact on the firms’ price. The purpose of the tool is 
to elicit a share return response to a specific unanticipated event. The theoretical underpinning of 
the event study methodology is founded by efficient market hypothesis (Malkiel & Fama, 1970) 
which promulgates the theory that a firm’s stock price reflects all available information and the 
expectations of the future prospects of the firm. An event study differentiates between the actual 
returns against the expected returns, which are the returns that would have been expected if the 
event had not taken place. Statistical methods, such as T-tests, are then employed to interrogate 
the significance of the event.  
This section provides an overview of the research design and the model that was created to 
deliver on the proposals. Issues surrounding the data are discussed, followed by a review of the 
research design and research instrument to be used. The chapter is organised as follows: 
Section 3.1 discusses the data and data sources. Section 3.3 presents the research design and 
chapter summary concludes the chapter. Issues of data collection and analysis in relation to this 
study will be provided, followed by an overview on the validity and reliability of this study.  
3.1 Data and Data Sources 
Two prevailing conditions had to be observed for a company to be included in the study. Firstly, 
the company’s stock value had to be publically listed in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) 
and secondly, any notifications of collusive behaviour had to be publically reported with relevant 
particulars readily available. These parameters ensured that the data collection can be readily 
obtained from prominent websites and public domains such as Bloomberg or Yahoo finance.  
Additionally, the South African Competition Tribunal was also used to correlate the accuracy of 
the event date as the tribunal publically lists companies that have been caught in collusive 
engagements as well as any penalties imposed. The study makes use of these event dates as 
the basis of a transgression as well as the SENS announcements from the Bloomberg archives.   
Once the population had been determined, the daily share price data was then collected from the 
Bloomberg archives from the year 2002 to 2014. In many instances, several companies were not 
yet listed as early as 2002 and their data was therefore collected from the date of registration. In 
all instances, this did not impede the event window period or skew the estimation window in any 
way.  
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3.2 Population and Sample 
3.2.1 Population 
Companies that conformed to the prescribed parameters in section 3.2 were then packaged into 
their respective industry sectors for ease of differentiation, namely construction; food and 
pharmaceutical sectors. Twenty five (25) companies make up the population in total. 
However, not all of the twenty five companies were directly implicated in collusive practice.  Nine 
of the fifteen construction companies were directly implicated in collusive announcements and 
therefore met the selection criterion. However, the all fifteen (15) construction companies have 
been assessed to ascertain the impact to the industry overall. The same applies to the food and 
pharmaceutical sectors. Only one company has been evaluated in the petro-chemical sector due 
to the lack of competition and publically listed information. 
The population for the study is listed as in Table 1. 
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INDUSTRIAL SECTORS 
AND COMPANY 
NAMES  
      
CONSTRUCTION  FOOD  PHARMACEUTICAL  PETRO-CHEMICAL 
AFRIMAT LTD ASTRAL FOODS LTD 
ADCOCK INGRAM 
HOLDINGS LTD 
SASOL 
AVENG LTD AVI LTD ASCENDIS HEALTH LTD   
GROUP FIVE LTD 
CLOVER INDUSTRIES 
LTD 
ASPEN PHARMACARE 
HOLDINGS LT 
  
MURRAY & ROBERTS 
HOLDINGS 
ILLOVO SUGAR LTD 
CIPLA MEDPRO SOUTH 
AFRICA LT 
  
PPC LTD OCEANA GROUP LTD     
RAUBEX GROUP LTD PIONEER FOODS LTD     
STEFANUTTI STOCKS 
HOLDINGS 
QUANTUM FOODS 
HOLDINGS 
    
WILSON BAYLY 
HOLMES-OVCON 
RCL FOODS 
LTD/SOUTH AFRICA 
    
BASIL READ HOLDINGS 
LTD 
TIGER BRANDS LTD     
ESOR LTD TONGAAT HULETT LTD     
Table 1: Total population 
For further differentiation, the construction companies that were directly implicated in 
collusive engagements as listed by the Competition Tribunal are highlighted in light grey.  
Afrimat LTD and PPC LTD were not directly implicated in the collusion nor fined by the 
competition tribunal, but have been included in the regression analysis to analyse 
possible trend. Similarly to the construction cartel, two of the ten food and beverage 
companies were directly involved in the bread cartel scandal have been included in the 
investigation. Similarly in the pharmaceutical section, Adcock Ingram Holdings remain 
the sole candidate to conform to the selection criteria.  
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3.3 Research Design 
The event study method was developed to measure the effect of an unanticipated event on stock 
prices. Given market rationality, the change in value will be reflected in the market security. 
McKinlay, 1997, suggests that there is no unique structure to conducting an event study analysis, 
but does however prescribe a general flow of analysis. The initial task is to define the event, 
which in this case is an announcement referring to a collusive engagement, after which the 
period over which the security prices of the firms involved in the event will be examined.  
 
These event dates are defined in Table 10 in the addendum.  
3.3.1 The Market Model 
After the event dates have been selected, the model for analysis must be decided upon. There 
are two common choices for modelling the normal return, namely the constant return model and 
the market model. The most common model used for analysis, the ‘market model’, is a statistical 
model which relates the return of any given security to the return of the market portfolio 
(MacKinlay, 1997)  and is applied to this study due to the relevance of predicting normal returns 
around an event date. The benefit of using the market model will depend upon the R2 of the 
market model regression. The higher the R2 the greater is the variance reduction in the abnormal 
return and subsequently the larger is the gain.   
This study also analyses results using the single factor return model. The single factor model 
regresses the firm’s stock returns against a single market reference as opposed to the two factor 
model which regresses the firm’s stock return against both the market and industry reference. 
This study makes use of the JSE All Share index as the market reference in the model.  
3.3.2 Length of the Estimation Window 
Once the appropriate model has been selected, the length of the event window must be decided. 
The length of the event window must also be representative of the nature of the event being 
studied (Ryngaert & Netter, 1990, pp 275). Long event windows drastically reduce the power of 
the test statistic which leads to false inferences about the significance of the event (McWilliams & 
Siegel, 1997). The windows should therefore be as short as possible to capture the significant 
effect of the event as well as eradicate any confounding events. Consideration must also be 
given to the likelihood of leakage of the event information prior to the announcement. 181 day 
event windows, which equates to approximately nine trading months, were not uncommon in the 
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McWilliams and Siegel study. The study also found that multiple studies were used without 
justification of the window periods.   
 
Brown and Warner suggested that an ideal short term estimation window to be 120 days prior to 
the pre event, as generally the event period itself is not included. (Brown & Warner, 1985). A 41 
day event window is usually employed, comprised of 20 pre-event days, the event day and 20 
post event days (MacKinlay, 1997). 
 
 
Figure 1: Estimation period and event window 
For the purpose of this research an estimation window period of 120 days will be used as well as 
a 41 day event window. 
3.3.3 Abnormal Return and Cumulative Abnormal Return 
 The appraisal of the event’s impact requires a measure of the abnormal return on a particular 
day. This represents the difference between the actual stock return (Ri,t) on that day and the 
normal return of the firm over the event window. The normal return is defined as the expected 
return should the event not had taken place.  The abnormal reaction of the value of the stock 
returns will be measured as the difference between the actual and the predicted returns. The 
predicted returns are based on two inputs, namely, the typical relationship between the 
references index and the firms stock (expressed by the slope (α) and intercept (βi) parameters) 
and the actual reference market’s return (Rm,t). Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal 
returns are calculated as follows: 
 
 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (α + β𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡) (1) 
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where ARi,t represents the abnormal stock return of firm i on day t, and Ri,t is the stock return of firm 
i on day t, Rm,t represents the rate of return of the market index on day t and α, β represent the 
slope and the intercept of the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the linear model that 
describe the sensitivity of Ri,t  to the market index of Rm,t (calculated for an estimated window of 
120 days). 
A sample study is an analysis performed for multiple events of the same type and may yield 
typical stock market response patterns. Typical abnormal returns associated with a distinct point 
in time are defined as follows: 
 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖 =  
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑡=1
 (2) 
However, the sum of the individual abnormal returns can be summed to measure the window 
event, which is the impact of the event over a particular period of time. This is known as the 
cumulative abnormal return.  
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖  (𝑡1, 𝑡2)  = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
 (3) 
 
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR’s) are further calculated should the sample study 
hold multiple observations of the same event type, which represents the mean values of identical 
events. CAR I,tl,t2 is the cumulative stock return of firm i from day t1 to t2 
 
 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖 =  
1
𝑛
∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝑡1, 𝑡2)
𝑛
𝑡=1
 (4) 
3.3.4 Regression  
A regression describes and evaluates the relationship between a given variable and one or more 
other variables. A regression analysis is conducted to calculate the alpha, beta and sigma values 
that explain the relationship between the firm’s security and its market reference. These three 
parameters can then be used to predict the normal returns for days in the event window.  Under 
general conditions ordinary least squares (OLS) is a consistent estimation procedure for the 
market model. The abnormal return, the metric of interest, is then found in the difference 
between predicted return and the normal return.   
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3.3.5 Testing for Significance  
The testing framework for abnormal returns, known as the t-test, is used to asses weather the 
cumulative average abnormal return is significantly different from zero (it’s expected value) is 
computed as the standard deviation: 
 
𝜎(𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇1, 𝑇2)) =  √
1
𝑁(𝑁 − 𝑑)
∑(𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇1, 𝑇2) − 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇1, 𝑇2))
2
𝑛
𝑡=1
 (5) 
The null hypothesis plays an important role when testing the statistical significance of an 
outcome as well as the techniques for aggregating the individual normal returns of a firm. There 
are always two hypotheses that go together in the hypothesis testing framework, denoted as H0 
for the null hypothesis and H1 as the alternative hypothesis. The null hypothesis is the statement 
that is actually being tested and the alternate hypothesis represents the remaining outcomes of 
interest. In this study the null hypothesis follows as: 
H0 :   = 0 
H1 :   ≠ 0 
This hypothesis testing framework relies on a test of significance which rejects the null 
hypothesis should the estimated value differ significantly from zero. A statistical decision rule is 
then applied to determine the magnitude of significance. In this study, the 5% confidence rule is 
applied under normal distribution conditions, illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Confidence interval applied to the study (Brooks, 2014) 
 If the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level, it is said that the test is statistically significant. 
The opposite is true if the test is not rejected, it is then said to be insignificant. However, this 
does not mean to say that a statistically significant result will be practically significant. A slightly 
higher beta value exceeding 2.03, say 2.16, may be statistically significant but may not have a 
significant financial or practical bearing on the outcome. 
The cumulative abnormal return measures the average effect of the value on n firms. The 
significance of the abnormal return implies that the event had a significant impact on the value of 
the firms if it is significantly greater than zero. A positive t-test will imply that there was a positive 
impact to the firm’s security whilst a negative value will imply that the security decreased in 
value.  
In this study, the test statistic is applied to the individual firms associated with the collusion as 
well as a cross-sectional test applied to the industry as a whole to test for significance. A cross 
sectional t-Test is also applied to test the variance across the industry competitors in the event 
field, and is calculated as: 
 
𝑇𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 =  
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑇1, 𝑇2)
𝜎(𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑇1, 𝑇2))
 (6) 
 
-2.03 +2.03
2.5% rejection region2.5% rejection region
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3.4 Underlying Assumptions  
A few conventions need to underpin the study in order to produce tangible results.   
3.4.1 Market Efficiency  
The first assumption implies that stock prices instantaneously incorporate all relevant information 
available to investors on the market, rendering the market efficient. An event is therefore 
anything that results in new information being transmitted to an investor.  
3.4.2 Unanticipated Events 
The event study relies on unanticipated announcements to the press. Anticipated 
announcements or leaked information will distort the results of the study as it is difficult to 
determine when traders became aware of the event news.  
3.4.3 Confounding Effects 
The third and most critical assumption presumes that the event in question is isolated from any 
other rival events within the same period. For example, the announcement of the company’s 
dividend release over the same window period would distort the abnormal return. This distortion 
of the event also becomes more problematic the longer the window period.   
3.5 Measuring and Analysing Abnormal Returns 
The analysis of the market model requires some notational explanation before commencement. 
Returns are indexed using event time noted as 𝒕. The event date is then defined as t = 0 which 
then defines the event window as t = T1 + 1 to T2 by association. The estimation can then be 
given as t = T0 + 1 to t = T1. Let L1 = T1 – T0 and L2 = T2 – T1 be the length of the estimation 
window and the event window respectively. This is illustrated in Figure 3 accordingly.  
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Figure 3: Timeline for an event study 
Figure 3 depicts the timeline arrangement in the analysis which ensures that the estimation 
window and event window do not overlap. Including the event window in the estimation period 
could have a large influence on the normal return measure and in turn could have an impact on 
the event.  
3.6 Limitations of the Study 
An event study is an uncomplicated research method which allows elementary interpretation of 
results. The methodology allows the assessor to investigate both gains and losses caused by a 
given event and the associated perception of the market. In certain instances, market inefficiency 
may taint the stock prices reflection as they do not immediately incorporate the information at 
hand. Some events may also be expected which further induces bias into the stock returns.  
Estimation periods are widely varied given the type of research which could further bias return 
values. This could also be exaggerated by coexisting events within the estimation window which 
may potentially affect the accuracy of the readings. 
The choice of model as well as the choice of market reference will also have a bearing on the 
results in both magnitude and significance. For example the average market return model will 
produce upwardly and downwardly bias for the abnormal return in a bullish or bearish market, 
respectively.  
Lastly, cross sectional dependence can occur should calendar clustering of events occur. Cross 
correlation of abnormal stock returns could occur if there is an overlap of event dates or sample 
stocks.  
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CHAPTER 4: PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
Chapter 4 presents the results of the analysis. The analysis was conducted in Microsoft Excel as 
per the research design outlined in Chapter 3. Twenty one (21) out of the twenty six (26) events 
listed in Table 10 in the addendum were analysed independently to obtain their abnormal returns 
and associated t-tests to assess significance of the results. The event findings are grouped into 
the varying industries namely, construction, food and beverage, petrochemical and 
pharmaceutical and tabled herein.  
4.1 Results Pertaining to Question one 
H0: A firm’s market value will be significantly affected whenever collusive announcements are 
published. 
4.2 Events Occurring within the Construction Industry 
The construction sector accounted for 13 of the 25 collusive events listed in Table 2. This 
represents the most prominent collusive sector in South Africa with over 50% of the count. 
Publically listed information was available for 7 of the 13 events as listed in Table 10:  
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Event 
no. 
Date  Ticker  
Listed: 
Information 
available 
Industry Company 
2 13-Feb-09 AEG Yes  Construction  Aveng  
6 01-Sep-09 AEG Yes Construction  AVENG  
    MUR     Murray and Roberts  
    WBO     WBHO 
    GRF     Group 5 
    SSK     Steffanutti Stocks 
    RBX     Raubex 
    BSR     Basil Read 
    ESR     Esor 
7 11-Nov-09 PPC  Yes Construction  PPC 
      No   Lafarge 
      No   Afrisam 
10 10-Aug-10 AEG Yes Construction  Aveng  
12 26-Aug-10   No Steel/ Scrap metal merchants 
        Construction   
13 25-Oct-10   No Construction Pipe cartel 
14 01-Nov-10   No Steel/ Scrap metal merchants 
        Construction   
16 03-Nov-10   No Steel/ Scrap metal merchants 
        Construction   
21 01-Feb-11 AEG Yes Construction  Aveng 
    MUR Yes   Murray and Roberts 
22 07-Feb-11   No Steel/ SA Metal and Machinery (SAM) 
      No Construction National Scrap Metal 
      No   Ben Jacobs Metals 
24 16-Mar-11 LBH Yes Property Liberty Group Limited  
      No Market Win Twice Properties 
25 02-Apr-12 ACL Yes Steel/ Acer Mittal South Africa LTD 
    EHS Yes Construction Highveld Steel 
      No   Vanadium Corporation LTD 
26 22-Jul-13 AEG Yes Construction  AVENG  
    MUR Yes   Murray and Roberts  
    WBO Yes   WBHO 
    GRF Yes   Group 5 
    SSK Yes   Steffanutti Stocks 
    RBX Yes   Raubex 
    BSR Yes   Basil Read 
    ESR Yes   Esor 
Table 2: Construction sector events 
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Events 2, 6, 7, 10, 21, 24, 25 and 26 have been analysed in the study and presented herein.  
4.2.1 Event 2 
Event 2 relates to a press statement by the competition commission finding Aveng (Africa) 
culpable to an R46m penalty against the subsidiary Infraset for collusive tendering in the market. 
The company was fined 8 % of Infraset’s revenue for fixing the selling price of pipes, culverts and 
manholes. A consent agreement by the company revealed that the offending parties had regular 
meetings around the country in which they discussed and agreed to divide contracts amongst 
each other, divide geographic markets and allocate products to one another. 
Regression 2 Output: 
Event Dates   
Regression Window Begin 24-Jul-08 
Regression Window End 15-Jan-09 
Event Window Begin 16-Jan-09 
Event 13-Feb-09 
Event Window End 13-Mar-09 
 
Regression Results 
Companies Involved AEG 
ALPHA (Intercept) -0.0020 
BETA (Slope) 0.9646 
Standard Error 0.0394 
R-square 0.3366 
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Significance 2 Testing: 
Hypothesis Test: Null Hypothesis: CAR = 0 
Companies Involved AEG 
Mean -0.0531 
Standard Deviation 0.0731 
Sum -2.1775 
Count 41 
T-stat -4.6526 
T-crit -2.0211 
Significant (T-test) Yes 
p-Value 0.0000 
Significant (p-Value) Yes 
Cross-sectional testing is not applicable given the absence of other industry participants. 
 
Figure 4: Event 2 CAR reaction 
4.2.2 Event 6 
Event no. 6 refers the release of a SENS announcement by the competition tribunal of its 
intention to investigate allegations of collusion in the construction sector as well as an 
announcement outlining penalties to steel companies for participating in collusive practice.  
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Regression 6 output: 
Event Dates   
Regression Window Begin 05-Feb-09 
Regression Window End 31-Jul-09 
Event Window Begin 03-Aug-09 
Event 01-Sep-09 
Event Window End 30-Sep-09 
 
Regression Results 
Companies Involved AEG MUR WBO GRF SSK RBX BSR ESR 
ALPHA (Intercept) 0.0025 0.0003 0.0012 0.0010 0.0010 0.0029 -0.0013 0.0027 
BETA (Slope) 0.6940 0.7480 0.3794 0.5893 0.3149 0.4148 0.2754 0.3665 
Standard Error 0.0224 0.0270 0.0164 0.0232 0.0341 0.0256 0.0206 0.0315 
R-square 0.2405 0.2015 0.1503 0.1747 0.0274 0.0795 0.0556 0.0426 
Significance 6 Testing: 
Hypothesis Test: Null Hypothesis: CAR = 0 
Companies Involved AEG MUR WBO GRF SSK RBX BSR ESR 
Mean 0.0223 0.1089 0.0049 0.0880 -0.0354 -0.0457 0.1831 -0.0300 
Standard Deviation 0.0549 0.1085 0.0361 0.0612 0.0528 0.0428 0.0838 0.0404 
Sum 0.9147 4.4642 0.2019 3.6089 -1.4514 -1.8756 7.5087 -1.2301 
Count 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 
T-stat 2.6022 6.4279 0.8726 9.2044 -4.2898 -6.8392 13.9861 -4.7502 
T-crit -2.0211 -2.0211 -2.0211 -2.0211 -2.0211 -2.0211 -2.0211 -2.0211 
Significant (T-test) Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
p-Value 1.9871 2.0000 1.6119 2.0000 0.0001 0.0000 2.0000 0.0000 
Significant (p-Value) No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 
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Cross-sectional 6 Testing: 
Hypothesis Test: Null Hypothesis: CAAR = 0 
Cross Sectional T-test (CAAR) 
Mean 0.0982 
Standard Deviation 0.1252 
Sum 0.7853 
Count 8 
T-stat 2.2177 
T-crit -2.36462 
Significant (T-test) No 
p-Value 1.937909 
Significant (p-Value) No 
 
 
Figure 5: Event 6 CAR reaction 
4.2.3 Event 7 
Event 7 involves a SENS announcement by the cement and aggregate company, PPC Pty LTD, 
whereby they confess to their transgressions in the price fixing of cement and are subsequently 
afforded conditional leniency. 
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Regression 7 output: 
Event Dates   
Regression Window Begin 20-Apr-09 
Regression Window End 13-Oct-09 
Event Window Begin 14-Oct-09 
Event 11-Nov-09 
Event Window End 09-Dec-09 
 
Regression Results 
Companies Involved PPC 
ALPHA (Intercept) 0.0001 
BETA (Slope) 0.3295 
Standard Error 0.0204 
R-square 0.0467 
Significance 7 Testing: 
Hypothesis Test: Null Hypothesis: CAR = 0 
Companies Involved PPC 
Mean -0.0515 
Standard Deviation 0.0281 
Sum -2.1107 
Count 41 
T-stat -11.7159 
T-crit -2.0211 
Significant (T-test) Yes 
p-Value 0.0000 
Significant (p-Value) Yes 
Cross-sectional testing is not applicable given the absence of other industry participants. 
 40 
 
Figure 6: Event 7 CAR reaction 
Figure 6 indicates resuscitation in the negative return trend 3 days prior to the announcement on 
event day 0. The announcement triggers a negative trend in the security in the days after the 
event.  
4.2.4 Event 10 
Event 10 formalizes the penalty valuation of Aveng's mining subsidiary, Duraset, to a value of 
R21.9m for colluding to fix the price of mining roof bolts. In terms of the settlement Duraset 
admits that it was involved in collusive agreements, arrangements and understandings with DSI 
(Pty) Ltd and Videx (Pty) Ltd. The penalty handed to Aveng accounts for 5% of Duraset’s 2008 
annual turnover. The investigation revealed that the cartel may have been started in the 1990’s 
and was resuscitated in 2002 when DSI entered the market.  
Regression 10 Output: 
Event Dates   
Regression Window Begin 15-Jan-10 
Regression Window End 09-Jul-10 
Event Window Begin 12-Jul-10 
Event 10-Aug-10 
Event Window End 07-Sep-10 
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Regression Results 
Companies Involved AEG 
ALPHA (Intercept) -0.0010 
BETA (Slope) 0.7186 
Standard Error 0.0167 
R-square 0.2352 
Significance 10 Testing: 
Hypothesis Test: Null Hypothesis: CAR = 0 
Companies Involved AEG 
Mean 0.0952 
Standard Deviation 0.0546 
Sum 3.9039 
Count 41 
T-stat 11.1690 
T-crit -2.0211 
Significant (T-test) Yes 
p-Value 2.0000 
Significant (p-Value) No 
Cross-sectional testing is not applicable given the absence of other industry participants. 
 
Figure 7: Event 10 CAR reaction 
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Figure 7 indicates a positive trend in the abnormal return prior to the event day. This positive 
trend continues despite the negative announcement on event day 0. This positive trend possibly 
implies that the negativity associated with the announcement was not significant enough to 
overcome the trend.   
4.2.5 Event 21 
Event 21 featured an announcement relating to a "fast track settlement" and reduced 
administrative penalty for the construction companies implicated in the 2010 soccer world cup 
collusion scandal. The announcement also noted that the firm, Group 5 Pty. LTD, had been 
assisting the competition commission since 2009 in the investigation and also noted that they 
had received  applications for leniency received from Aveng Grinaker-LTA and Murray and 
Roberts. 
Regression 21 Output: 
Event Dates   
Regression Window Begin 13-Jul-10 
Regression Window End 03-Jan-11 
Event Window Begin 04-Jan-11 
Event 01-Feb-11 
Event Window End 01-Mar-11 
 
Regression Results 
Companies Involved AEG MUR 
ALPHA (Intercept) 0.0015 -0.0003 
BETA (Slope) 0.5128 0.4863 
Standard Error 0.0119 0.0125 
R-square 0.1123 0.0934 
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Significance 21 Testing: 
Hypothesis Test: Null Hypothesis: CAR = 0 
Companies Involved AEG MUR 
Mean -0.1203 -0.1698 
Standard Deviation 0.0900 0.1656 
Sum -4.9309 -6.9610 
Count 41 41 
T-stat -8.5557 -6.5638 
T-crit -2.0211 -2.0211 
Significant (T-test) Yes Yes 
p-Value 0.0000 0.0000 
Significant (p-Value) Yes Yes 
Cross-sectional 21 Testing: 
Hypothesis Test: Null Hypothesis: CAAR = 0 
Cross Sectional T-test (CAAR) 
Mean -0.3546 
Standard Deviation 0.1684 
Sum -0.7091 
Count 2 
T-stat -2.9769 
T-crit -12.7062 
Significant (T-test) No 
p-Value 0.2063 
Significant (p-Value) No 
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Figure 8: Event 21 CAR reaction 
Figure 8 illustrates a significant loss in the share return for the companies Aveng and Murray and 
Roberts. This negative cycle continues to depreciate in the days after the announcement, on 
event day 0.  
4.2.6 Event 24 
The competition commission referred event 24 to the tribunal as it announced that the retail 
property market had colluded to divide the property market into two deeds of restraint which in 
turn favoured the allocation of customers and territories to individual retailers. Both the Liberty 
Group (Pty) Limited and Win Twice Properties (Pty) Limited compete in the retail market in the 
Bedfordview area via the Eastgate Mall and Bedford Square shopping centres respectively. The 
investigation established that Bedford Square was restrained from concluding a lease agreement 
with a major anchor tenants, in violation of the act.  
Regression 24 Output: 
Event Dates   
Regression Window Begin 26-Aug-10 
Regression Window End 15-Feb-11 
Event Window Begin 16-Feb-11 
Event 16-Mar-11 
Event Window End 14-Apr-11 
 45 
Regression Results 
Companies Involved LBH 
ALPHA (Intercept) -0.0004 
BETA (Slope) 0.5616 
Standard Error 0.0092 
R-square 0.1977 
Significance 24 Testing: 
Hypothesis Test: Null Hypothesis: CAR = 0 
Companies Involved LBH 
Mean -0.0006 
Standard Deviation 0.0323 
Sum -0.0247 
Count 41 
T-stat -0.1193 
T-crit -2.0211 
Significant (T-test) No 
p-Value 0.9056 
Significant (p-Value) No 
Cross-sectional testing is not applicable due to the absence of other industry competitors. 
 
Figure 9: Event 24 CAR reaction 
Figure 9 depicts a sharp decline in the company’s security on the day of the announcement. The 
returns subsequently improve in the days proceeding the event.  
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4.2.7 Event 25 
Event 25 announced the penalties associated with price fixing and market allocation for flat steel 
products. The commission referred the collusion case against Acer-Mittal South Africa Ltd, 
Highveld Steel and Vanadium Corporation Ltd to the tribunal for adjudication. The investigation 
followed suit after complaints that the Mittal and Highveld had adjusted their steel prices by a 
similar margin at a similar time in 2008.  
Regression 25 output: 
Event Dates   
Regression Window Begin 09-Sep-11 
Regression Window End 01-Mar-12 
Event Window Begin 02-Mar-12 
Event 02-Apr-12 
Event Window End 04-May-12 
 
Regression Results 
Companies Involved ACL EHS 
ALPHA (Intercept) 0.0002 -0.0008 
BETA (Slope) 0.9247 0.0217 
Standard Error 0.0147 0.0214 
R-square 0.3357 0.0001 
Significance 25 Testing: 
Hypothesis Test: Null Hypothesis: CAR = 0 
Companies Involved ACL EHS 
Mean -0.0911 -0.2100 
Standard Deviation 0.0475 0.0947 
Sum -3.7351 -8.6107 
Count 41 41 
T-stat -12.2800 -14.2063 
T-crit -2.0211 -2.0211 
Significant (T-test) Yes Yes 
p-Value 0.0000 0.0000 
Significant (p-Value) Yes Yes 
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Cross-sectional 25 Testing: 
Hypothesis Test: Null Hypothesis: CAAR = 0 
Cross Sectional T-test (CAAR) 
Mean -0.0543 
Standard Deviation 0.0749 
Sum -0.2715 
Count 2 
T-stat -1.0245 
T-crit -12.7062 
Significant (T-test) No 
p-Value 0.4923 
Significant (p-Value) No 
 
 
Figure 10: Event 24 CAR reaction 
Figure 10 illustrates a downward trend for both companies 20 days’ priors to the event day. 
There is a marginal reaction to the event news on day 0 and some indication of recovery in the 
20 days postdating the event.  
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4.2.8 Event 26 
Event 26 deals with well-publicised consent agreements reached with the Competition 
Commission for all 8 colluding construction companies over the 2010 soccer world cup scandal. 
Heavy penalties were imposed on all offending companies. 
Regression 26 Output: 
Event Dates   
Regression Window Begin 27-Dec-12 
Regression Window End 21-Jun-13 
Event Window Begin 24-Jun-13 
Event 22-Jul-13 
Event Window End 20-Aug-13 
 
Regression Results 
Companies Involved AEG MUR WBO GRF SSK RBX BSR ESR 
ALPHA (Intercept) -0.0005 0.0004 -0.0002 0.0025 0.0006 0.0021 -0.0009 0.0012 
BETA (Slope) 0.7100 0.4421 0.4256 0.4017 0.1053 0.2388 0.1493 0.5200 
Standard Error 0.0196 0.0143 0.0134 0.0174 0.0170 0.0188 0.0207 0.0313 
R-square 0.1062 0.0797 0.0841 0.0461 0.0035 0.0144 0.0047 0.0244 
Significance 26 Testing: 
Hypothesis Test: Null Hypothesis: CAR = 0 
Companies Involved AEG MUR WBO GRF SSK RBX BSR ESR 
Mean 0.0163 -0.0203 -0.0047 -0.0107 -0.0379 0.0107 -0.0853 -0.0565 
Standard Deviation 0.0591 0.0425 0.0226 0.0329 0.0248 0.0402 0.0472 0.0399 
Sum 0.6675 -0.8339 -0.1934 -0.4369 -1.5519 0.4374 -3.4993 -2.3185 
Count 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 
T-stat 1.7627 -3.0651 -1.3392 -2.0751 -9.7715 1.6991 -11.5803 -9.0646 
T-crit -2.0211 -2.0211 -2.0211 -2.0211 -2.0211 -2.0211 -2.0211 -2.0211 
Significant (T-test) No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
p-Value 1.9144 0.0039 0.1881 0.0445 0.0000 1.9029 0.0000 0.0000 
Significant (p-Value) No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
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Cross-sectional 26 Testing: 
Hypothesis Test: Null Hypothesis: CAAR = 0 
Cross Sectional T-test (CAAR) 
Mean -0.0399 
Standard Deviation 0.0461 
Sum -0.3191 
Count 8 
T-stat -2.4449 
T-crit -2.3646 
Significant (T-test) Yes 
p-Value 0.0444 
Significant (p-Value) Yes 
 
 
Figure 11: Event 26 CAR reaction 
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4.3 Events Occurring within the Petrochemical Sector 
The petrochemical sector accounted for 7 of the 26 collusive events listed in Table 10. This 
represents the second most prominent collusive sector in South Africa with 27% of the count. 
Publically listed information was available for all 6 of the events as listed in Table 3 below: 
Event 
no. 
Date  Ticker  
Listed: 
Information 
available 
Industry Company 
3 06-May-09 SOL Yes Petrochemical Sasol  
4 19-May-09 SOL Yes Petrochemical Sasol  
8 05-Jul-10 SOL Yes Petrochemical Sasol  
9 04-Aug-10   No Petrochemical Foskor 
11 12-Aug-10 SOL Yes Petrochemical Sasol  
19 14-Dec-10 SOL Yes Petrochemical Sasol  
23 28-Feb-11 SOL Yes Petrochemical Sasol Chemical Industries 
Table 3: Petrochemical sector events 
Events 3, 4, 8, 11, 19, and 23 have been analysed in the study and presented herein.  
4.3.1 Event 3 
Event 3 documents the settlement of R188m between Sasol and the competition commission for 
Sasol’s inclusion in a fertiliser cartel. This fine represents the highest settlement reached with the 
commission and was based on 6% of the annual turnover to the Sasol nitro division. The 
complaint was filed by Nutri-grow, a smaller blender and distributer of fertiliser.  
Regression 3 Output: 
Event Dates   
Regression Window Begin 08-Oct-08 
Regression Window End 31-Mar-09 
Event Window Begin 01-Apr-09 
Event 06-May-09 
Event Window End 03-Jun-09 
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Regression Results 
Companies Involved SOL 
ALPHA (Intercept) 0.0014 
BETA (Slope) 1.4028 
Standard Error 0.0248 
R-square 0.7130 
Significance 3 Testing: 
Hypothesis Test: Null Hypothesis: CAR = 0 
Companies Involved SOL 
Mean -0.0779 
Standard Deviation 0.0343 
Sum -3.1959 
Count 41 
T-stat -14.5697 
T-crit -2.0211 
Significant (T-test) Yes 
p-Value 0.0000 
Significant (p-Value) Yes 
Cross-sectional testing is not available due to the absence of other industry conspirators.  
 
Figure 12: Event 3 CAR reaction 
Figure 12 illustrates a relatively significant disruption on the event day, followed by a sharp 
recovery in the return and then a resumption of the decline. 
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4.3.2 Event 4 
Sasol internal investigations confirm the competition commission’s findings discussed in event 3, 
which fully contravene the Competition Act. As a result the penalty is increased from 6% of the 
annual revenue to 8% of the revenue over the same period. This represents an increase from 
R188m to R250m. The commission’s approach is to incentivise timeous and full disclosure of any 
uncompetitive behaviour. Sasol’s internal investigations are viewed as being extremely late and 
leniency is therefore not considered.  
Regression 4 Output: 
Event Dates   
Regression Window Begin 21-Oct-08 
Regression Window End 15-Apr-09 
Event Window Begin 16-Apr-09 
Event 19-May-09 
Event Window End 17-Jun-09 
 
Regression Results 
Companies Involved SOL 
ALPHA (Intercept) 0.0001 
BETA (Slope) 1.3616 
Standard Error 0.0226 
R-square 0.7207 
Significance 4 Testing: 
Hypothesis Test: Null Hypothesis: CAR = 0 
Companies Involved SOL 
Mean 0.0351 
Standard Deviation 0.0270 
Sum 1.4397 
Count 41 
T-stat 8.3417 
T-crit -2.0211 
Significant (T-test) Yes 
p-Value 2.0000 
Significant (p-Value) No 
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Cross-sectional testing is not available due to the absence of other industry conspirators.  
 
Figure 13: Event 4 CAR reaction 
Figure 13 illustrates a downward trend on the announcement day, event window 0. The returns 
show signs of recovery after approximately two trading weeks after the announcement.   
4.3.3 Event 8 
Following the collusive announcements made in event 3 and including the heavy R250m penalty 
imposed in event 4, Sasol reaches and agreement with the Competition Commission to divest 5 
of its fertiliser blending facilities. The settlement relates to Sasol’s abuse of dominance, 
exclusionary conduct and price discrimination in the supply of ammonia and its derivative 
products. In terms of the agreement, Sasol are to divest 5 of their ammonia nitrate facilities, 
excluding their flagship Secunda facility, within 12 months of the agreement.  
Regression 8 Output: 
Event Dates   
Regression Window Begin 08-Dec-09 
Regression Window End 03-Jun-10 
Event Window Begin 04-Jun-10 
Event 05-Jul-10 
Event Window End 02-Aug-10 
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Regression Results 
Companies Involved SOL 
ALPHA (Intercept) -0.0004 
BETA (Slope) 0.8794 
Standard Error 0.0111 
R-square 0.4694 
Significance 8 Testing: 
Hypothesis Test: Null Hypothesis: CAR = 0 
Companies Involved SOL 
Mean 0.0127 
Standard Deviation 0.0106 
Sum 0.5198 
Count 41 
T-stat 7.6830 
T-crit -2.0211 
Significant (T-test) Yes 
p-Value 2.0000 
Significant (p-Value) No 
Cross-sectional testing is not available due to the absence of other industry conspirators.  
 
Figure 14: Event 8 CAR reaction 
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Figure 14 shows no significant trends preceding or postdating the announcement. 
4.3.4 Event 11 
The commission referred a case between Sasol and Safripol for collusion and excessive pricing 
in the polymers market. A case was instituted in 2007 following complaints from the department 
of trade and industry (DTi) relating to the pricing of polymers and its negative impact on 
diversified growth and employment in the manufacturing industry. The commission found that 
Sasol had charged excessive prices for the polymer products in line with import parity pricing. 
Furthermore, it concluded that Sasol and Safripol had colluded in the supply agreement and 
implementation of the pricing strategy. A penalty representing 10% of the annual turnover was 
sought from the offending parties.  
Regression 11 Output: 
Event Dates   
Regression Window Begin 19-Jan-10 
Regression Window End 13-Jul-10 
Event Window Begin 14-Jul-10 
Event 12-Aug-10 
Event Window End 09-Sep-10 
 
Regression Results 
Companies Involved SOL 
ALPHA (Intercept) -0.0002 
BETA (Slope) 0.9131 
Standard Error 0.0105 
R-square 0.5606 
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Significance 11 Testing: 
Hypothesis Test: Null Hypothesis: CAR = 0 
Companies Involved SOL 
Mean 0.0104 
Standard Deviation 0.0109 
Sum 0.4253 
Count 41 
T-stat 6.1108 
T-crit -2.0211 
Significant (T-test) Yes 
p-Value 2.0000 
Significant (p-Value) No 
Cross-sectional testing is not available due to the absence of other industry conspirators.  
 
Figure 15: Event 11 CAR reaction 
Figure 15 depicts a relatively insignificant change in the share returns around the event 
announcement. Initially, an increase is observed over the 4 days after the announcement but 
then normalise toward the 0% mark toward the end of the window period.  
4.3.5 Event 19 
Event 19 formalises the settlement amount described in event 11, whereby Sasol and Safripol 
conspire to fix pricing in the polymer market. Sasol Polymers agreed to pay 3% of their annual 
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turnover derived from polymer products, approximately R111m, in all aspects discussed in event 
11.   
Regression 19 Output: 
Event Dates   
Regression Window Begin 26-May-10 
Regression Window End 15-Nov-10 
Event Window Begin 16-Nov-10 
Event 14-Dec-10 
Event Window End 13-Jan-11 
 
Regression Results 
Companies Involved SOL 
ALPHA (Intercept) 0.0003 
BETA (Slope) 1.0434 
Standard Error 0.0096 
R-square 0.5219 
Significance 19 Testing: 
Hypothesis Test: Null Hypothesis: CAR = 0 
Companies Involved SOL 
Mean -0.0117 
Standard Deviation 0.0109 
Sum -0.4792 
Count 41 
T-stat -6.8603 
T-crit -2.0211 
Significant (T-test) Yes 
p-Value 0.0000 
Significant (p-Value) Yes 
Cross-sectional testing is not available due to the absence of other industry conspirators. 
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Figure 16: Event 19 CAR reaction 
4.3.6 Event 23 
Event 23 documents minor amendments to the consent agreement noted in event 19 by 
introducing terms of payment as well as introducing a mechanism to police the implementation of 
the terms of settlement. The accord requires Sasol to pay R6m within 60 days of the notification 
and appoints the commission to enforce the agreement.  
Regression 23 Output: 
Event Dates   
Regression Window Begin 10-Aug-10 
Regression Window End 28-Jan-11 
Event Window Begin 31-Jan-11 
Event 28-Feb-11 
Event Window End 29-Mar-11 
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Regression Results 
Companies Involved SOL 
ALPHA (Intercept) 0.0006 
BETA (Slope) 0.9347 
Standard Error 0.0088 
R-square 0.4464 
Significance 23 Testing: 
Hypothesis Test: Null Hypothesis: CAR = 0 
Companies Involved SOL 
Mean 0.0389 
Standard Deviation 0.0253 
Sum 1.5958 
Count 41 
T-stat 9.8606 
T-crit -2.0211 
Significant (T-test) Yes 
p-Value 2.0000 
Significant (p-Value) No 
Cross-sectional testing is not available due to the absence of other industry conspirators. 
 
Figure 17: Event 23 CAR reaction 
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4.4 Events Occurring within the Food and Beverage Sector 
The food and beverage sector accounted for 5 of the 26 collusive events listed in Table 10. This 
represents the third most prominent collusive sector with 20% of the count. Publically listed 
information was available for all 5 of the events as listed in Table 4 below: 
Event 
no. 
Date  Ticker  
Listed: 
Information 
available 
Industry Company 
5 29-Jun-09 PIK Yes Food and Bev Pick n Pay 
    SHP Yes   Shoprite/Checkers 
    WHL Yes   Woolworths 
    SPP Yes   Spar 
    MSM Yes   Massmart 
      No   Metcash 
15 02-Nov-10 PIO Yes Food and Bev Pioneer Foods  
17 22-Nov-10 PIO Yes Food and Bev Pioneer Foods  
18 24-Nov-10 PIO Yes Food and Bev Pioneer Food 
20 27-Jan-11 PIK Yes Food and Bev Pick n Pay 
    SHP Yes   Shoprite/Checkers 
    WHL Yes   Woolworths 
    SPP Yes   Spar 
    MSM Yes   Massmart 
      No   Metcash 
Table 4: Food and beverage sector events 
Events 5, 15, 17, 18, and 20 have been analysed in the study and presented herein.  
4.4.1 Event 5 
The competition commission announces an investigation into the supermarket industry for 
alleged contraventions to the Competition Act. The investigation includes major South African 
supermarket chains; Pick n Pay, Shoprite/Checkers, Woolworths and Spar as well as wholesaler-
retailers Massmart and Metcash. Investigations into the food and agro processing sector 
emerged from the general public and varying stakeholders. The commission identified several 
potential concerns ranging from the concentration of buyer power to long term exclusive lease 
agreements. 
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Regression 5 Output: 
Event Dates   
Regression Window Begin 28-Nov-08 
Regression Window End 28-May-09 
Event Window Begin 29-May-09 
Event 29-Jun-09 
Event Window End 27-Jul-09 
 
Regression Results 
Companies Involved PIK SHP WHL SPP MSM 
ALPHA (Intercept) 0.0004 0.0017 0.0007 0.0005 0.0000 
BETA (Slope) 0.4557 0.3451 0.5936 0.3139 0.2931 
Standard Error 0.0212 0.0193 0.0209 0.0196 0.0245 
R-square 0.1804 0.1322 0.2781 0.1089 0.0636 
Significance 5 Testing: 
Hypothesis Test: Null Hypothesis: CAR = 0 
Companies Involved PIK SHP WHL SPP MSM 
Mean 0.0029 -0.0255 0.0314 -0.0078 0.0144 
Standard Deviation 0.0285 0.0225 0.0510 0.0189 0.0325 
Sum 0.1203 -1.0457 1.2858 -0.3179 0.5904 
Count 41 41 41 41 41 
T-stat 0.6595 -7.2581 3.9384 -2.6247 2.8370 
T-crit -2.0211 -2.0211 -2.0211 -2.0211 -2.0211 
Significant (T-test) No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
p-Value 1.4867 0.0000 1.9997 0.0122 1.9929 
Significant (p-Value) No Yes No Yes No 
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Cross-sectional 5 Testing: 
Hypothesis Test: Null Hypothesis: CAAR = 0 
Cross Sectional T-test (CAAR) 
Mean 0.0078 
Standard Deviation 0.0713 
Sum 0.0388 
Count 5 
T-stat 0.2437 
T-crit -2.7764 
Significant (T-test) No 
p-Value 1.1806 
 
 
Figure 18: Event 5 CAR reaction 
Figure 18 depicts a relatively constant volatility before the event date. The returns become more 
diversified after the announcement but offer no cross sectional significance.   
4.4.2 Event 15 
The event publicises the settlement between the competition commission and Pioneer foods. 
Pioneer foods were found guilty of adjusting the price of pricing flour and bread to reduce its 
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gross margin by R160m. Their anti-competitive behaviour negatively impacted the consumer and 
and the ability of small to medium sized firms enter and grow in the market. Pioneer agreed to 
settle R250m as an administration penalty to the National Revenue Fund as well as paying 
R250m to an Agro-processing Competitiveness fund.  
Regression 15 Output: 
Event Dates   
Regression Window Begin 13-Apr-10 
Regression Window End 04-Oct-10 
Event Window Begin 05-Oct-10 
Event 02-Nov-10 
Event Window End 30-Nov-10 
 
Regression Results 
Companies Involved PFG 
ALPHA (Intercept) 0.0022 
BETA (Slope) 0.3097 
Standard Error 0.0165 
R-square 0.0559 
Significance 15 Testing: 
Hypothesis Test: Null Hypothesis: CAR = 0 
Companies Involved PFG 
Mean -0.0549 
Standard Deviation 0.0362 
Sum -2.2517 
Count 41 
T-stat -9.7052 
T-crit -2.0211 
Significant (T-test) Yes 
p-Value 0.0000 
Significant (p-Value) Yes 
Cross-sectional testing is not available due to the absence of other industry conspirators. 
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Figure 19: Event 15 CAR reaction 
Figure 19 indicates a negative trend in the days leading up to the event day, a volatile rebound 
on the day of the announcement and then resumption in the negative cycle.  
4.4.3 Event 17 
Event 17 publically announces the agreement to settle eight separate investigations undertaken 
by the commission to involving transgressions by Pioneer Foods against the Competitions Act. 
The investigations involved maize and wheat milling, baking, poultry and egg industries. The 
conduct ranged from collusion, unlawful information sharing and predatory pricing.  
Regression 17 Output: 
Event Dates   
Regression Window Begin 04-May-10 
Regression Window End 22-Oct-10 
Event Window Begin 25-Oct-10 
Event 22-Nov-10 
Event Window End 21-Dec-10 
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Regression Results 
Companies Involved PFG 
ALPHA (Intercept) 0.0018 
BETA (Slope) 0.2860 
Standard Error 0.0164 
R-square 0.0445 
Significance 17 Testing: 
Hypothesis Test: Null Hypothesis: CAR = 0 
Companies Involved PFG 
Mean -0.0103 
Standard Deviation 0.0416 
Sum -0.4225 
Count 41 
T-stat -1.5861 
T-crit -2.0211 
Significant (T-test) No 
p-Value 0.1206 
Significant (p-Value) No 
Cross-sectional testing is not available due to the absence of other industry conspirators. 
 
Figure 20: Event 17 CAR reaction3 
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Figure 20 illustrate a continuation of the downward trend around the event day and a sudden 
spike in the return two weeks after the event. These results are however proven to be statistically 
insignificant.  
4.4.4 Event 18  
Pioneer foods is granted conditional leniency after agreeing to pay R250m to the National 
Revenue Fund as an administrative penalty as well as R250 to establish an Agro-processing 
competitive fund. Furthermore, Pioneer agrees to adjust its pricing of flour and bread such as to 
reduce its gross margin. The present settlement agreement excludes the R195m fine imposed 
for Pioneer’s participation in cartel activities in the bread industry.  
Regression 18 Output: 
Event Dates   
Regression Window Begin 06-May-10 
Regression Window End 26-Oct-10 
Event Window Begin 27-Oct-10 
Event 24-Nov-10 
Event Window End 23-Dec-10 
 
Regression Results 
Companies Involved PFG 
ALPHA (Intercept) 0.0017 
BETA (Slope) 0.2867 
Standard Error 0.0164 
R-square 0.0443 
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Significance 18 Testing: 
Hypothesis Test: Null Hypothesis: CAR = 0 
Companies Involved PFG 
Mean 0.0043 
Standard Deviation 0.0429 
Sum 0.1769 
Count 41 
T-stat 0.6444 
T-crit -2.0211 
Significant (T-test) No 
p-Value 1.4770 
Significant (p-Value) No 
 
 
Figure 21: Event 18 CAR reaction 
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4.4.5 Event 20 
The competition commission revealed its findings of the industry probe into four major South 
African retailers and two international wholesalers. The supermarket investigation followed from 
the commissions prioritisation of food markets in the context of the public perception of high 
grocery prices, high market concentration and significant barriers to entry of the major retailers. 
Several competition concerns were highlighted throughout the investigation, namely: 
1. Exclusive lease agreements. 
2. Information exchange. 
3. Abuse of power and exclusive pricing. 
4. Category management in relation to product, payment, promotion and price. 
Regression 20 Output: 
Event Dates   
Regression Window Begin 08-Jul-10 
Regression Window End 29-Dec-10 
Event Window Begin 30-Dec-10 
Event 27-Jan-11 
Event Window End 24-Feb-11 
 
Regression Results 
Companies Involved PIK SHP WHL SPP MSM 
ALPHA (Intercept) -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0008 0.0010 
BETA (Slope) 0.6403 0.7470 0.6039 0.4784 0.5183 
Standard Error 0.0087 0.0108 0.0121 0.0099 0.0135 
R-square 0.2716 0.2476 0.1464 0.1378 0.0919 
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Significance 20 Testing: 
Hypothesis Test: Null Hypothesis: CAR = 0 
Companies Involved PIK SHP WHL SPP MSM 
Mean -0.0586 -0.0801 -0.0685 -0.0528 -0.0388 
Standard Deviation 0.0414 0.0311 0.0513 0.0310 0.0247 
Sum -2.4014 -3.2853 -2.8070 -2.1645 -1.5902 
Count 41 41 41 41 41 
T-stat -9.0666 -16.4737 -8.5408 -10.8917 -10.0407 
T-crit -2.0211 -2.0211 -2.0211 -2.0211 -2.0211 
Significant (T-test) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
p-Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Significant (p-Value) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cross-sectional 20 Testing: 
Hypothesis Test: Null Hypothesis: CAAR = 0 
Cross Sectional T-test (CAAR) 
Mean -0.0656 
Standard Deviation 0.0121 
Sum -0.3278 
Count 5 
T-stat -12.1508 
T-crit -2.7764 
Significant (T-test) Yes 
p-Value 0.0003 
Significant (p-Value) Yes 
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Figure 22: Event 20 CAR reaction 
Figure 22 shows a typical downward trend affecting all competitors. Both individual and cross-
sectional significance can is evident in this event.   
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4.5 Events Occurring within the Pharmaceutical Sector 
The competition commission submitted papers to the competition tribunal on the 11 February 
2008 with regards to collusive practices within the pharmaceutical sector. Adcock Ingram, Listed 
information was available for 1 of the 3 alleged firms, namely Adcock Ingram Critical Care, 
Dismed Criticare and Thusanong Health Care were implicated in the scandal and subject to legal 
action by the tribunal. The Directors of Tiger Brands Pty LTD were also allegedly involved in the 
scandal for knowing about the collusion but doing nothing about it. The investigations had been 
ongoing since 2005 with the help of Fresenius Kabi South Africa, who were afforded leniency for 
their role in bringing the investigations to a head.  
Event 1 
Regression 1 Output: 
Event Dates   
Regression Window Begin 19-Jul-07 
Regression Window End 11-Jan-08 
Event Window Begin 14-Jan-08 
Event 11-Feb-08 
Event Window End 10-Mar-08 
 
Regression Results 
Company Involved TBS 
ALPHA (Intercept) -0.0015 
BETA (Slope) 0.5824 
Standard Error 0.0121 
R-square 0.3222 
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Significance 1 Testing: 
Hypothesis Test: Null Hypothesis: CAR 
= 0 
Company Involved TBS 
Mean -0.0765 
Standard Deviation 0.0706 
Sum -3.1350 
Count 41 
T-stat -6.9391 
T-crit -2.0211 
Significant (T-test) Yes 
p-Value 0.0000 
Significant (p-Value) Yes 
 
 
Figure 23: Event 1 CAR reaction 
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4.6 Results Pertaining to Question Two 
H1: The valuation change to the stock price will always be negative.   
The second research question sought to establish if the firm’s valuation change in the security 
would always be negative given the negative association with the announcement. Table 5 
summarises the t-stat distribution of all the events and highlights the cells according to their 
polarity. The green highlighted cells indicate a positive reflection in the CAR return and the red 
highlighted cells prescribe a negative change to the firms share return associated with the event.  
 
  
T-stat results per event 
  
Company 
1 
Company 
2 
Company 
3 
Company 
4 
Company 
5 
Company 
6 
Company 
7 
Company 
8 
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Event 2 -4.6526               
Event 6 2.6022 6.4279 0.8726 9.2044 -4.2898 -6.8392 13.9861 -4.7502 
Event 7 -11.7159               
Event 10 11.1690               
Event 21 -8.5557 -6.5638             
Event 24 -0.1193               
Event 25 -12.2800 -14.2063             
Event 26 1.7627 -3.0651 -1.3392 -2.0751 -9.7715 1.6991 -11.5803 -9.0646 
P
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Se
ct
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Event 3 -14.5697               
Event 4 8.3417               
Event 8 7.6830               
Event 11 6.1108               
Event 19 -6.8603               
Event 23 9.8606               
F&
B
 S
ec
to
r 
Event 5 0.6595 -7.2581 3.9384 -2.6247 2.8370       
Event 15 -9.7052               
Event 17 -1.5861               
Event 18 7.6830               
Event 20 -9.0666 -16.4737 -8.5408 -10.8917 -10.0407       
P
h
ar
m
a 
Event 1 -6.9391               
Table 5: t-stat distribution 
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Construction 
Sector 
Petrochemical 
Sector 
Food and 
Beverage 
Sector 
Pharmaceutical 
Sector 
Up 33% 67% 36%   
Down 67% 33% 64%   
Table 6: Share price reaction to event news 
Table 6 reflects the market’s reaction to the news as a reflected by the increase or decrease in 
the share return. Roughly two thirds of the markets react negatively to the event news throughout 
the construction and food and agro sectors, whilst the opposite is true for the petrochemical 
sector. Only one event was analysed within the pharmaceutical sector and can therefore not 
draw any meaningful conclusion from the event.  
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4.7 Summary of Findings 
This chapter has presented the results of the study as they occurred. In order to answer the first 
research question the study categorised each event into an appropriate sector and analysed the 
event as per the methodology prescribed in Chapter 3. A regression analysis was conducted on 
each event to obtain the abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns of the firms before applying 
the t-test for individual significance and, where applicable, the cross-sectional t-test for industry 
significance. A graph plotting the reaction of the event was also attached in as a part of the 
results.  
 
The second research question sought to ascertain if the negative announcement would always 
deliver a negative valuation change in the firm’s stock value. The t-statistic was tabulated in for 
each event and tabulated in Table 5. The table colour coded the polarity of the t-statistic given 
the positive or negative change.  
 
These results will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 5.   
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
This chapter interprets the results presented in Chapter 4 and provides discussion around the 
economic and practical meaning of the outcomes. The discussion of the event findings are 
grouped into the varying industries namely, construction, food and beverage, petrochemical and 
pharmaceutical and tabled herein. 
5.1 Discussion Pertaining to Research Question One 
The event study was implemented to 20 of the 26 collusive events tabled in Table 10, 
representing 77% of the original population. Six event dates were discarded due to a lack of 
publically available information. Of the 20 events identified, 43 firms were studied across 4 
different sectors of the economy.  
The first research question sought to understand if the share return of a firm would be 
significantly affected after the release of a collusive announcement, given the negativity 
surrounding collusion and corruption. The statistical significance of this question was tested 
through the t-test at a 5% confidence interval, as discussed in Chapter 3.  
The research question H0 hypothesised that “A firm’s market value will be significantly affected 
whenever collusive announcements are published.” The significance results are summarised in 
Table 7 below: 
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T-stat results per event 
    
Company 
1 
Company 
2 
Company 
3 
Company 
4 
Company 
5 
Company 
6 
Company 
7 
Company 
8 
C
o
n
st
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n
 S
ec
to
r 
Event 2 Yes               
Event 6 Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Event 7 Yes               
Event 10 Yes               
Event 21 Yes Yes             
Event 24 No               
Event 25 Yes Yes             
Event 26 No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
P
et
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al
 
Se
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o
r 
Event 3 Yes               
Event 4 Yes               
Event 8 Yes               
Event 11 Yes               
Event 19 Yes               
Event 23 Yes               
F&
B
 S
ec
to
r 
Event 5 No Yes Yes Yes Yes       
Event 15 Yes               
Event 17 No               
Event 18 Yes               
Event 20 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes       
P
h
ar
m
a 
Event 1 Yes 
              
Table 7: Individual statistical significance 
Table 7 summarises the statistical significance across all events and all companies analysed. Of 
the 43 t-statistics conducted in the study, 36 (84%) were found to be statistically significant at a 
5% confidence interval. The “Yes” denoted in the table implies that the results are significantly 
different from zero, whilst the opposite is true for “No”. 
H0 can therefore not be rejected as there is significant evidence to suggest that the market value 
will be affected whenever collusive announcements are published.  
Cross-sectional significance, however does not demonstrate a strong relationship across industry 
competitors.  
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Event 6 
Event 
21 
Event 
25 
Event 
26 
Event 5 
Event 
20 
t-stat 1 No No No Yes No Yes 
Table 8: Cross-sectional statistical significance 
The construction sector and the food and beverage sector were the only industries to produce 
events which did not produce a significantly significant result. These will be elaborated on in 
further detail herein. 
5.1.1 The Construction Sector 
Nearly 80% of the field (19 of the 24) companies analysed over the 8 construction events, tested 
positive for individual significance. The positive results were both significantly and practically 
significant in nearly all instances, only 5 of the results did not yield a significant t-test. These 5 
events and results will be analysed in further detail herein: 
Event 6  
Event no. 6 released the initial news of the investigation into the construction cartel as well as an 
announcement outlining penalties to steel companies for participating in collusive practices. 7 of 
the 8 companies tested positive for significance, with the company Wilson Bailey Holmes Ovcon 
(WBHO) being the only company to not indicate any reaction to the event at a 5% confidence 
interval, with a t-stat reading of 0.87.  
This insignificant reading can possibly be explained by the company’s strong balance sheet 
represented and a high market cap at the time. Cross-sectional testing also reals a weak 
relationship between WBHO’s reaction and the other industry peers. Interestingly, 5 of the 8 
results also represent a positive reaction to the news which implies that the announcement may 
not have been fully understood or appreciated by the market. The news was seemingly 
discarded as being inconsequential given the positive variance.  
Event 24 
This event broke news of the retail property market colluding to divide the property market into 
two deeds of restraint, which in turn favoured the allocation of customers and territories to 
individual retailers. In this instance, there was no statistical significance by the market with a t-
stat of -0.11 recorded. Figure 9 depicts a fairly responsive drop in the returns on the event day, 
but is still fairly insignificant at the 5% mark.  
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A possible explanation for this can be the nature of the event itself. Both the Liberty Group (Pty) 
Limited and Win Twice Properties (Pty) Limited compete in the retail market in the same 
Bedfordview area via the Eastgate Mall and Bedford Square shopping centres respectively. The 
investigation established that Bedford Square was restrained from concluding a lease agreement 
with a major anchor tenants, in violation of the act. The market could have interpreted this as an 
administrative error rather than a deliberate attempt to divide and disseminate territories. The 
penalty for the alleged collusion was also never published in the announcement and the market 
could therefore not have foreseen the impact to the firm’s security.  
Event 26 
Event 26 formalises the tribunal findings and penalty reparations against the colluding 
construction cartel. This news comes 3 years after the initial investigation announcement made 
in event 6. Three of the eight firms do not show a statistically significant reaction to the 
announcement, with Aveng, WBHO and Raubex recording insignificant t-values. Additionally, 
Murray and Roberts and Group 5 also record relatively low t-statistics. These values may be 
statistically significant but are not practically or financially significant. With 5 of the 8 companies 
showing very little reaction to the news, this implies that the market either had prior warning of 
the bad news or had factored to reparations into the firms security ahead of the announcement.  
A Noteworthy Event 
Event 21 featured an announcement relating to a "fast track settlement" and reduced 
administrative penalty for the construction companies implicated in the 2010 soccer world cup 
collusion scandal. The announcement also noted that the firm, Group 5 Pty. LTD, had been 
assisting the competition commission since 2009 in the investigation and also noted that they 
had received  applications for leniency received from Aveng Grinaker-LTA and Murray and 
Roberts. 
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Figure 24: Event 21 CAR reaction 
Figure 24 illustrates a significant loss in the share return for the companies Aveng and Murray 
and Roberts. There appears to be relatively insignificant volatility leading up the the 
announcement with a sharp decline in the returns on the day of the announcement. This negative 
cycle continues to depreciate in the days after the announcement, on event day 0.  
This event implies that the news took the market by surprise and that the firm’s value was not 
accurately represented by the share price. The outcome of this event relates to the research by 
Fombrun and Stanley (1990), in a study of 292 large U.S. firms, which found empirical evidence 
that public construct reputations on the basis of information about firms' relative structural 
positions within organizational fields, specifically using market and accounting signals indicating 
performance, institutional signals indicating conformity to social norms, and strategy signals 
indicating strategic postures (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). 
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5.1.2 The Food and Beverage Sector 
Event 5 and event 17 revealed statistically insignificant reactions to the announcements and will 
be expanded upon herein. 
Event 5 
The announcement launched an investigation into the supermarket industry for alleged 
contraventions to the Competition Act. The investigation includes major South African 
supermarket chains; Pick n Pay, Shoprite/Checkers, Woolworths and Spar as well as wholesaler-
retailers Massmart and Metcash.  
Pick n Pay were the only company to not show a significant reaction to the news with a t-stat 
value of 0.65, at a 5% confidence interval. The remaining 80% of the field showed significant 
reactions to the news.  
No penalty values were published in this announcement which could possibly account for the 
anomaly.  
Event 17  
Event 17 publically announces the agreement to settle eight separate investigations undertaken 
by the commission to involving transgressions by Pioneer Foods against the Competitions Act.  
The reaction to the news is not significant, most like due a similar announcement release 3 
weeks earlier in event 15 for a similar transgression. Once again, no mention is made as to the 
financial reparations to be made.   
5.2 General Observations  
The results are fairly conclusive with 84% of the field registering statistical significance at a 5% 
confidence interval. The lack of significance may lie within the following discussion topics: 
Leakage of Event News 
Researchers interpret the abnormal return as a measure of the effect of the information received 
by investors. The abnormal return is therefore reflects the amount of wealth gained or lost by the 
event. In order to maintain the purity of the result it is therefore important that the event date to 
be as accurate as possible and avoid conflict with other confounding events. Depending on the 
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event analysed, researchers can often have difficulty identifying the actual event date as well as 
when the information reached the market for analysis. To counter balance this, researchers 
sometimes expand the event window to make sure the event date is included within a lengthened 
event period. This can however also lead to problems as the longer event window can create 
opportunity for more confounding events to be included with the date to be analysed. This in turn 
reduces the power of the test statistic because of the additional ‘noise’ added to the event.  
Leakage may well be prevalent within this study, as an enquiry into a collusive action typically 
takes 2 – 4 years to investigate and report findings. This falls well outside any typical event 
window period and makes it nearly impossible for researchers to identify when the market 
became aware of the information. The same can be said in instances where companies undergo 
a merger and/or acquisition. These deals are usually structured over a lengthy period of time and 
do not ‘shock’ the market upon announcement.  
There are mathematical remedies available for researchers to handle leakage, which have not 
been applied to this study, however one would have to assume that leakage played a very small 
impact in the study give the 84% return on significance. Additional research can also be applied 
to this study to reassess the results of the analysis as well as the strength of the test statistic 
using a leakage filter. The event windows and estimation periods can also be adjusted should 
researchers be so inclined.  
Scale of Economy 
It appears that some firms with large market capitalizations seem to suffer less than smaller 
firms. This is possibly an indication of shareholders perception of absolute value of the 
consequences? The shareholder may perceive that the larger firms have the ability to rebound 
back from penalties whilst the opposite is true for smaller firms. Future study needed here 
because of the poor correlation between AR and market cap.  
Investability Quotient 
The Investability Quotient (IQ) is a term derived by Standard and Poor’s (S&P) to define how 
good a firm’s medium to long term investment potential is. Other considerations in the rating 
include the company’s relative strength, liquidity, credit rating and volatility. It stands to reason 
that shareholders are unlikely to be perturbed by the announcement of an investigation into a 
sector, and more likely to take action should the firm’s ‘investability’ be at risk. 
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The majority of the announcements in the events 5,6,17, 24 and 26 only make reference to the 
competition commission’s intention to investigate allegations of collusion against certain 
companies, and do not publish any financial penalties in the announcement. The announcement 
of ‘the intention to investigate’ does not appear to threaten the firms ‘investability’ and hence the 
market remains composed. However, this cannot be said for event 26, as the announcement 
clearly lists the values of the penalties attached to each offending contractor.  
If event 26 is treated as an anomaly, there appears that a degree of correlation exists between 
the announcements that publish the quantum of the penalty to the volatility of market reaction. 
Further research is required to determine the accuracy of this observation as well as further 
investigation into the value that markets place on long term investibility versus their ability to 
‘forgive’ companies that fall foul of good corporate governance. 
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5.3 Discussion Pertaining to Research Question Two 
H1 hypothesised that “The valuation change to the stock price will always be negative.” Table 9, 
from Chapter 4, has been reproduced below:   
  
T-stat results per event 
  
Company 
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2 
Company 
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Company 
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Company 
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Event 2 -4.6526               
Event 6 2.6022 6.4279 0.8726 9.2044 -4.2898 -6.8392 13.9861 -4.7502 
Event 7 -11.7159               
Event 10 11.1690               
Event 21 -8.5557 -6.5638             
Event 24 -0.1193               
Event 25 -12.2800 -14.2063             
Event 26 1.7627 -3.0651 -1.3392 -2.0751 -9.7715 1.6991 -11.5803 -9.0646 
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Event 3 -14.5697               
Event 4 8.3417               
Event 8 7.6830               
Event 11 6.1108               
Event 19 -6.8603               
Event 23 9.8606               
F&
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Event 5 0.6595 -7.2581 3.9384 -2.6247 2.8370       
Event 15 -9.7052               
Event 17 -1.5861               
Event 18 7.6830               
Event 20 -9.0666 -16.4737 -8.5408 -10.8917 -10.0407       
P
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Event 1 -6.9391               
Table 9: Individual statistical significance 
Over 63% of the field returned a negative response to the announcements made, whilst 16 of the 
44 firms analysed recorded a positive return. Over 60% of the events analysed in the 
construction and food and beverage sectors manufactured negative returns whilst conversely, 
over 80% of the events analysed in the petrochemical produced a positive outcome. Only one 
event was analysed in the pharmaceutical sector which was found to be negative. Further 
investigation into events yielding positive values is discussed herein. 
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5.3.1 The Construction Sector  
Event 6 
This event refers the release of a SENS announcement by the competition tribunal of its intention 
to investigate allegations of collusion in the construction sector as well as an announcement 
outlining penalties to steel companies for participating in collusive practice. 5 of the 8 companies 
interestingly indicated positive reaction to the news. A positive explanation for this may be the 
nature of the announcement itself as well as the macro economic conditions in the country at the 
time of the announcement.  
The announcement merely makes mention of the tribunals intention to launch an investigation. 
Intentions do not necessarily always transform into penalties and is possibly not enough to scare 
investors away from the investment. The announcement also does not refer to any tangible 
penalty against the firm which is also not enough incentive for the investor to abandon the 
security.  
At the time of the announcement in 2009, South Africa was in the process of preparing for the 
2010 soccer world cup. There was a considerable amount of investment into the country’s 
infrastructure and the industry as a whole was fairly vibrant. Investors probably gauged that their 
growth in their returns would outweigh the negativity associated with the threat of an investigation 
into collusion.  
Event 10 
Event 10 formalizes the penalty valuation of Aveng's mining subsidiary, Duraset, to a value of 
R21.9m for colluding to fix the price of mining roof bolts. In terms of the settlement Duraset 
admits that it was involved in collusive agreements, arrangements and understandings with DSI 
(Pty) Ltd and Videx (Pty) Ltd. The penalty handed to Aveng accounts for 5% of Duraset’s 2008 
annual turnover. The investigation revealed that the cartel may have been started in the 1990’s 
and was resuscitated in 2002 when DSI entered the market. 
An explanation for the positive yield can possibly be explained by the length of time it took to 
reach a conclusion. The efficient market hypothesis relies on the market incorporating all 
available information and news into the stock price. Given the fact that this matter took a few 
years to conclude implies that the market had already factored the penalty into the firm’s value. 
The upward trend in Figure 7, reproduced below, also attests to this theory as the market 
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appears to be preoccupied by other more profitable news or movements in the company balance 
sheet.  
 
Event 26 
This event schedules the penalties leveraged against the colluding contractors. 2 of the 8 
companies analysed in this event yield a positive return. However, these positive returns are not 
statistically significant or practically significant. The majority of the negative reactions are both 
statistically and practically significant which can be seen in Figure 11, reproduced here, which 
shows a downward trend in abnormal return.  
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5.3.2 The Petrochemical Sector  
Event 4, 8, 11 and 23 indicate a positive reaction to the news. This represents 80% of the field 
analysed, in stark contradiction to the rest of the study. Possible explanations for the 
contradictory reactions follow as: 
 The association of the announcement to previously heard news 
 The frequency of the news 
 The relationship between Sasol’s core oil and gas business to the peripheral industries 
being fined 
 The volatility of the fuel price as well as macroeconomic conditions 
Event no. 4 and 8 are directly associated to the initial news identified in event no. 3. Event 4 
confirms Sasol’s own internal investigations confirm the competition commission’s findings 
discussed in event 3, which fully contravene the Competition Act. As a result the penalty is 
increased from 6% of the annual revenue to 8% of the revenue over the same period. This 
represents an increase from R188m to R250m. Similarly, in event 8, Sasol reach and agreement 
with the Competition Commission to divest 5 of its fertiliser blending facilities for the said 
collusion triggered in event 3.  
These events are effectively spin-offs from event 3 and do not appear to deter the market from 
the initial bad news and pricing of the security. Interestingly, there was a significant negative 
reaction by the market to the news in event 3 but no subsequent reaction to similar news in the 
same context of event 4 and 8. This can be interpreted as the market initially holding the firm 
accountable for their actions, followed by a dilution of the consequence for news associated to 
the initial wrong doing.  
The frequency of the news must also be questioned. Event no. 3 was initially aired in May 2009, 
whilst event 4 followed a week after the announcement and event 8 followed one month after 
that. One can interpret the congestion between these announcements as a contributing factor to 
the lack of reaction from the market.  
Additionally, Sasol’s core business lies within the oil and gas sector, yet most of the news 
associated to collusion lay within their there subsidiary businesses away from the mainstream 
business. This could possibly account for the lack of reaction to certain events.  
The volatility in the oil price can also possibly be attributed to the market reaction. The oil price 
enjoyed a period of sustained growth despite the economic downturn in 2008/2009.   In January 
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2009 a barrel of Brent crude traded at around US$42 per barrel. Yet, only two years later, prices 
surged to more than US$125 per barrel in early May. This upturn could possibly overshadow the 
negative abnormal returns associated to the collusive announcement, as the growth in the firm’s 
primary commodity, namely oil and gas, flourished.   
5.3.3 The Food and Beverage Sector 
2 of the 5 events reflect some positive reactions by the market. Possible explanations for this 
follow as: 
Event 5 
3 of the 6 companies registered a positive reaction to the announcement of an investigation into 
the supermarket industry for alleged contraventions to the Competition Act. The outcome of the 
event analysis is inconclusive as 1 of these 3 positive reactions was not statistically significant, 
which renders a 50% split in the polarity of the market reactions. A possible explanation may lie 
in the nature of the announcement itself. The announcement does not impose any financial 
penalty but simply informs the market of an intention to investigate the supermarket industry. The 
announcement also identified several potential concerns ranging from the concentration of buyer 
power to long term exclusive lease agreements. The market is therefore unlikely to be perturbed 
given that no penalty has been imposed and no single company has been condemned. 
Event 18 
Even though this announcement is associated with collusive practice, the context of the news is 
actually quite positive from a corporate governance perspective. Investors would more than likely 
react positively to the news that Pioneer foods had been granted conditional leniency after 
agreeing to pay R250m to the National Revenue Fund as an administrative penalty as well as 
R250 to establish an Agro-processing competitive fund. This announcement is received 
positively by the market with a t-test of 7.083. This positive reaction is in tune with the positivity 
associated to the conditional leniency as well as the fact that the funds were being dispersed into 
vehicle that can regulate future collusive practice.  
In many respects, the result of the market reaction reaffirms the markets code of good conduct, 
but unfortunately doesn’t not hold true against the null hypothesis that the news will always be 
negative given a collusive announcement.  
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5.4 General Observations 
A negative response is typically received, at 63% of the analysis, but not always negative as 
prescribed in the null hypothesis. This can possibly be explained by the following salient points:  
Sample Size and Statistical Tests 
The test statistics become unreliable if the data is not normally distributed. The statistical tests on 
which event studies rely are based on normality assumptions that are only dependable if the 
sample size is large enough. We may therefore conclude that small may account for results 
which are not robust. 
Industry Clustering  
Researchers try to identify the impact of a particular event on a firm’s stock value caused by a 
particular event. Industry specific factors are a problem particularly if there are a large number of 
firms in the sample that belong to the same industry, otherwise known as clustering. This is 
caused by a degree of correlation amongst companies in the same industry, which can have an 
effect on the expected return model. When clustering occurs, conditions that may affect the 
industry end up affecting the companies within the cluster. To circumvent this, the researcher 
should be able to extract all stock price changes that are expected relative to the market. Only 
then will the researcher have confidence that the residual pricing will reflect the ‘pure event’. 
Clustering could potentially have influenced the results of this study given that the analysis was 
conducted on an industry specific basis. If anything the results could be skewed in favour of the 
null hypothesis. Further research will need to be conducted to exclude clustering bias.  
5.5 Summary of Discussion 
84% of the events analysed for the first research question registered a statistically significant 
reaction, at a 5% confidence interval. The events that produced an insignificant reaction were 
individually discussed and evaluated for a possible explanation. These explanations were 
classified and discussed in three categories, namely: 
 Leakage of the news prior to the announcement  
 Scale of economy 
 ‘Investability’ of the organisation  
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The second research question revealed that 63% of the results yielded a negative reaction by the 
market to the news of a collusive event. Although this reflects the majority of the field it does not 
completely satisfy the null hypothesis which states that the market reaction will always be 
negative upon receiving a collusive announcement.  
The quality of the test statistic was brought into question as well as the size of the sample being 
tested as possible conclusions for the discrepancies.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This purpose of the research study was threefold, namely, to identify the factors influencing 
corporate reputational damage, via a literature review. To conduct an event study on varying 
industries that took part in collisional practices and check for any statistical significance. And 
thirdly, assess if this news would always impact the market negatively given the negative 
association with companies that behave irresponsibly.  
The chapter has been structured in such a way that the conclusions in relation to the data 
gathered are presented, followed by recommendations, as well as providing suggestions for 
further research in this field.  
6.1 Conclusions of the Study 
6.1.1 Does Bad News Matter? 
 Continuing on from the Chapter 2.6, (Davidson & Worrel, 1988) addressed the literary debate of 
the 1980’s by firstly replacing corporate illegalities as a proxy for corporate social responsibility. 
Secondly, they assessed the financial performance via shareholder returns as the preferred 
medium of performance. They further argued that typical accounting-determined profitability 
measures were inadequate when measuring cross-sectional comparisons over industries and 
time. And lastly, they employed an event study as the chosen medium to evaluate the impact of 
the event against financial returns, premised upon the assumption that if the market operates 
efficiently it will penalize irresponsible acts.    
After incorporating these amendments into the study, the results showed that the market did 
react negatively to the announcement of corporate illegality. Their results showed that the market 
does, at least in the short term, penalize the stock price of firms that are caught in socially 
irresponsible acts.  
Similarly, this research has proven much the same, by adopting an event study as a proxy for 
investor response to an event. The results concluded that the market did in fact have a 
statistically significant reaction to the collusive announcements, and the consequent share 
reaction was predominantly negative.  
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Based on the results, one would have to conclude that bad news, and by inference poor 
corporate governance, does in fact matter albeit in the short term. The medium to long term 
effects need to be investigated further.  
6.1.2 The Balance Sheet is King 
One would have to conclude that investors are not easily distressed by the publication of 
company’s collusive practice given the sedentary reaction of the market to news which did not 
publish the financial penalties. It appears that nature of the announcement and implications to 
the firm’s financial position affect the volatility of the abnormal return and the magnitude of the 
reaction. This notion conforms to the efficient market hypothesis which concludes that the only 
way an investor can obtain a higher return is by purchasing riskier investments. In this context, 
the market has assigned very little threat to announcements that do not carry any tangible 
penalties and therefore do not over react to the news. The market also appears to apply a large 
degree of objectivity to the announcements, choosing stability in the firm’s balance sheet over 
potential fiscal threat.  
6.1.3 Transparency of the Information  
The underlying assumption discussed in Chapter 3, implies that stock prices instantaneously 
incorporate all relevant information available to investors on the market, rendering the market 
efficient. An event is therefore anything that results in new information being transmitted to an 
investor. The event study relies on unanticipated announcements to the press. Anticipated 
announcements or leaked information will distort the results of the study as it is difficult to 
determine when traders became aware of the event news.  
If the efficient market hypothesis holds true, the investment theory implies that the market 
continuously incorporates and reflects all available information into existing share prices. The 
collusive events used in this research traditionally take between 2 to 4 years to conclude. One 
could interpret some of the sedentary results in the study as being symptomatic of the market 
already incorporating much of the risk into the firm’s security by the time the announcement is 
released.  New information keeps getting infused into the market place daily which allows the 
investor to price new risk into the firm, which brings the transparency of the announcements into 
question.  
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However, with 84% of the study registering statistically significant reactions to the news, one 
would have to conclude that efficient market hypothesis has remained resolute and a study has 
demonstrated a significant short term reaction to the collusive news.  
The assessment of the magnitude of the reaction becomes slightly more contentious. Only 63% 
of the study rendered a negative reaction the collusive announcements, which is slightly less 
convincing than the 84% majority associated to the first research question. The third underlying 
assumption discussed in Chapter 3 presumes that the event in question is isolated from any 
other rival events within the same period. For example, the announcement of the company’s 
dividend release over the same window period would distort the abnormal return. This distortion 
of the event also becomes more problematic the longer the window period.  The analysis 
conducted in the petro-chemical sector provides strong evidence that the abnormal returns may 
be skewed by rival events within the same period. The discussions in Chapter 5 presume that a 
company’s core business venture may dilute the impact of the announcement on some 
secondary business streams, which provides a plausible explanation for lack of punitive action by 
the market. Overall, with a two thirds majority, the market did in fact apply punitive measures to 
the irresponsible company’s, implying an acceptable level of transparency throughout the 
process.   
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6.2 Recommendations 
This study has demonstrated that a company that engages in anti-competitive practice will, in all 
probability, be punished financially by their investors. The magnitude of the punishment will in all 
likelihood negatively affect the finance of the organisation in the short term. The medium to long 
term effects of this punishment are not fully understood and need to be further studied. The 
perception at this stage is that the incentive to commit anti-competitive practice still trumps the 
consequence of irresponsible behaviour. A few measures need to be put in place if the 
perception is to be altered.  
6.2.1 Punitive Measures  
 Perhaps the most obvious solution to the problem is for the authorities to reconsider the 
magnitude of the penalties imposed on colluding organisations. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
reputational risk is defined as the risk arising from a negative perception across a value chain of 
customers, shareholders, counterparties, investors, debt holders, market analysts, regulators and 
other relevant parties that can adversely affect the firm’s ability to maintain existing, or establish 
new, business relationships and continued access to sources of funding. The competition tribunal 
would do well to investigate imposing penalties or at least diluting the incentive to collude across 
the whole value chain of and not just the final perpetrator. For example, consider the implications 
if a regulatory penalty were to be imposed on the stock exchange in which the perpetrator 
operates, like the JSE, should anti-competitive practice be proven? The stock exchange would 
become complicit in policing anti-competitive practice as well as instituting additional regulatory 
frameworks to avoid the penalty. These punitive measures could be applied through the value 
chain to root out irresponsible behaviour.  
6.2.2 Incentive   
Incentives could also be used as a means to improve the general standard of corporate 
governance across all business streams. Tax benefits could be assigned to businesses that 
voluntarily enrol their employees into corporate governance training as well as submitting to 
frequent auditing by independent authorities. Whistle blowers could also receive further incentive 
other than immunity from disclosure, such as first right of refusal on selective bids.  
Market transparency and early detection policies and procedures need to be re-evaluated in 
further detail. Collusion is more often than not a product of slow poison which has been 
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administered over a long period of time and not the ‘headline busts’ we have become 
accustomed to seeing in the news.  
 
  
 96 
REFERENCES 
Anand, B. N., & Shachar, R. (1999). Brands, Information, and Loyalty. New York Times, 2.  
Argenti, P. A., & Druckenmiller, B. (2004). Reputation and the corporate brand. Corporate 
Reputation Review, 6(4), 368-374.  
Arlow, P., & Gannon, M. J. (1982). Social responsiveness, corporate structure, and economic 
performance. Academy of Management review, 7(2), 235-241.  
Barnett, M. L., Jermier, J. M., & Lafferty, B. A. (2006). Corporate reputation: The definitional 
landscape. Corporate Reputation Review, 9(1), 26-38.  
Baucus, M. S., & Baucus, D. A. (1997). Paying the piper: An empirical examination of longer-
term financial consequences of illegal corporate behavior. Academy of management 
Journal, 40(1), 129-151.  
Benjamin, C. (2013, 24 June 2013). Competition Commission orders 15 construction firms to pay 
up, Online Mail & Guardian p. 1. Retrieved from http://mg.co.za/article/2013-06-24-
competition-commission-orders-construction-firm-to-pay-up 
Binder, J. (1998). The event study methodology since 1969. Review of quantitative Finance and 
Accounting, 11(2), 111-137.  
Bondt, W. F., & Thaler, R. (1985). Does the stock market overreact? The journal of Finance, 
40(3), 793-805.  
Brockmann, C. (2009). The Mechanics of Collusion. Organization, Technology & Management in 
Construction: An International Journal, 1(2), 51-58.  
Brooks, C. (2014). Introductory econometrics for finance: Cambridge university press. 
Brown, S. J., & Warner, J. B. (1985). Using daily stock returns: The case of event studies. 
Journal of financial Economics, 14(1), 3-31.  
Cochran, P. L., Wood, R. A., & Jones, T. B. (1985). The composition of boards of directors and 
incidence of golden parachutes. Academy of management Journal, 28(3), 664-671.  
Competition Commission and Adcock Ingram No. 20/CR/Feb08, 1  (Competition Tribunal 2008). 
Administrative Penalty. 
Cummins, J. D., Lewis, C. M., & Wei, R. (2006). The market value impact of operational loss 
events for US banks and insurers. Journal of Banking & Finance, 30(10), 2605-2634.  
Davidson, W. N., & Worrel, D. L. (1988). The impact of announcements of corporate illegalities 
on shareholder returns. Academy of management Journal, 31(1), 195-200.  
Davidson, W. N., & Worrell, D. L. (1992). Research notes and communications: The effect of 
product recall announcements on shareholder wealth. Strategic Management Journal, 
13(6), 467-473.  
Eccles, R. G., Newquist, S. C., & Schatz, R. (2007). Reputation and its risks. Harvard Business 
Review, 85(2), 104-114, 156.  
Eckbo, B. E. (1983). Horizontal mergers, collusion, and stockholder wealth. Journal of financial 
Economics, 11(1), 241-273.  
Fombrun, C., & Shanley, M. (1990). What's in a name? Reputation building and corporate 
strategy. Academy of management Journal, 33(2), 233-258.  
Gaultier-Gaillard, S., & Louisot, J.-P. (2006). Risks to reputation: a global approach. The Geneva 
Papers on Risk and Insurance-Issues and Practice, 31(3), 425-445.  
 97 
Gillet, R., Hübner, G., & Plunus, S. (2010). Operational risk and reputation in the financial 
industry. Journal of Banking & Finance, 34(1), 224-235.  
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1977). Intuitive prediction: Biases and corrective procedures: DTIC 
Document. 
Keynes, J. M. (1937). The general theory of employment. The quarterly journal of economics, 
209-223.  
Khumalo, J., Nqojela, P., & Njisane, Y. (2013). Cover pricing in the construction industry: 
Understanding the practice within a competition context. 
MacKinlay, A. C. (1997). Event studies in economics and finance. Journal of economic literature, 
35(1), 13-39.  
Malkiel, B. G., & Fama, E. F. (1970). Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical 
work*. The journal of Finance, 25(2), 383-417.  
McWilliams, A., & Siegel, D. (1997). Event studies in management research: Theoretical and 
empirical issues. Academy of management Journal, 40(3), 626-657.  
Myers, D. (2013). Construction economics: a new approach: Routledge. 
Page, M., & Way, C. (1992). Stock market Overreaction: the south african Evidence. Investment 
Analysts Journal, 36(4), 35-49.  
Perry, J., & De Fontnouvelle, P. (2005). Measuring reputational risk: The market reaction to 
operational loss announcements. SSRN eLibrary.  
Power, M. (2004). The risk management of everything. Journal of Risk Finance, The, 5(3), 58-65.  
Rayner, J. (2004). Managing reputational risk: Curbing threats, leveraging opportunities (Vol. 6): 
John Wiley & Sons. 
Ryngaert, M., & Netter, J. (1990). Shareholder wealth effects of the 1986 Ohio antitakeover law 
revisited: Its real effects. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 253-262.  
Schwaiger, M. (2004). Components and parameters of corporate reputation-an empirical study. 
Schmalenbach business review, 56, 46-71.  
Sinanaj, G., & Muntermann, J. (2013). Assessing Corporate Reputational Damage of Data 
Breaches: An Empirical Analysis. in Proceedings of the 26th Bled eConference: 
eInnovation, Challenges and Impacts for Individuals, Organizations and Society, June 9-
13 2013, Bled, Slovenia.  
Smutniak, J. (2004). Living Dangerously: A Survey of Risk: Economist Newspaper. 
Sturm, P. (2013). Operational and reputational risk in the European banking industry: The market 
reaction to operational risk events. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 85, 
191-206.  
Ullmann, A. A. (1985). Data in search of a theory: a critical examination of the relationships 
among social performance, social disclosure, and economic performance of US firms. 
Academy of Management review, 10(3), 540-557.  
Varian, H. R., & Repcheck, J. (2010). Intermediate microeconomics: a modern approach (Vol. 6): 
WW Norton & Company New York, NY. 
Williams, J. B. (1938). The theory of investment value (Vol. 36): Harvard University Press 
Cambridge, MA. 
 
  
 98 
APPENDIX A: TABLE 10: EVENT DATES 
Event 
no. Date  Ticker  Listed Industry Company Event Description  Fine value 
    
 
Info 
available         
1 11-Feb-08 TBS Yes Pharma- Tiger Brands Adcock Ingram and Tiger brands involved in price fixing R110 m 
    ceutical    
2 13-Feb-09 AEG Yes  Construction  Aveng  
Aveng faces R46m fine for its findings into investigations 
in the Infraset Collusion. Pipes, culverts and manholes. 8 % of Infraset 
            
 
revenue 
                
3 6-May-09 SAS Yes 
Petro- 
chemical Sasol  Sasol settles fertiliser case with CC. R188m 
                
4 
19-May-
09 SAS Yes 
Petro- 
chemical Sasol  Sasol Penalty increased due to substantiated findings. 
6% to 8% 
meaning  
              
R188m to 
R250m 
                
5 29-Jun-09 PIK Yes Food and Bev Pick n Pay 
Press statement - CC to probe supermarket industry 
(Pick n Pay, Shoprite Woolworths,Spar)   
    SHP Yes   Shoprite/Checkers for contraventions of the act.    
    WHL Yes   Woolworths     
    SPP Yes   Spar     
    MSM Yes   Massmart     
      No   Metcash     
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Event 
no. Date  Ticker  Listed Industry Company Event Description  Fine value 
     
Info 
available         
6 1-Sep-09 ALL Yes Construction  CC 
CC requests fines for steel companies and initiates 
construction sector investigation. 10% for steel 
          
All construction 
companies  
 
  
                
7 11-Nov-09 PPC  Yes Construction  PPC 
PPC confesses to being a part of a cement cartel and 
gets conditional leniency   
      No   Lafarge 
 
  
      No   Afrisam    
8 5-Jul-10 SAS Yes 
Petro- 
chemical Sasol  Sasol to divest 5 of its fertiliser blending facilities R250m 
                
9 4-Aug-10   No 
Petro- 
chemical Foskor 
Foskor admits to collusion of phosphoric acid (fertiliser 
component) and    
            animal feed products   
                
10 10-Aug-10 AEG Yes Construction  Aveng  
Aveng's Duraset to fined R21.9m for collusion - mining 
roof bolts cartel. R21.1m 
                
11 12-Aug-10 SAS Yes 
Petro- 
chemical Sasol  
Sasol and Safripol admit to contravention of the act and 
agree to pay a penalty 
5% of annual rev 
from  
            
 
polyprop 
products 
            It is announced that a 10% penalty is sought from Sasol  R16,5m 
                
12 26-Aug-10   No Steel/ 
Scrap metal 
merchants 
Notification of Scrap metal merchants to to face 
collusion charges   
        Construction   
The merchants face charges that they set prices, divided 
markets, and fixing trading conditions   
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Event 
no. Date  Ticker  Listed Industry Company Event Description  Fine value 
    
 
Info 
available         
14 1-Nov-10   No 
Steel/Constr
uction  
Scrap metal 
merchants Notice of settlement agreement    
                
15 2-Nov-10 PIO Yes Food and Bev Pioneer Foods  
Competition commission settles with Pioneer foods - 
adjusting the price of R250m 
            
pricing flour and bread to reduce its gross margin by 
R160m   
            
Excluding the R195,7m settlement in Feb 2010 for their 
involvement in the     
            Bread Cartel   
                
16 3-Nov-10   No 
Steel/Constr
uction 
Scrap metal 
merchants Settlement agreements with scrap metal merchants   
            Universals penalty adjusted from R15m to R18m    
                
17 22-Nov-10 PIO Yes Food and Bev Pioneer Foods  
Notification of Tribunal hearing for Pioneer foods and 
Swan Plastics   
      No Construction  Swan Plastics Plastic pipes cartel   
                
18 24-Nov-10 PIO Yes Food and Bev Pioneer Food 
Pioneer granted conditional leniency - predatory pricing 
and information R250m 
            
sharing resulted in a administrative penalty of R250m 
being paid to    
            establish an Agro-processing competitive fund.    
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Event 
no. Date  Ticker  Listed Industry Company Event Description  Fine value 
    
 
Info 
available         
19 14-Dec-10 SAS Yes 
Petro-
chemicals Sasol  
Sasol settles its polymers collusion case with a R111m 
fine R111m 
            
Supply agreement between Sasol and Safripol Pty LTD 
resulted in indirect price fixing.   
                
20 27-Jan-11 PIK Yes Food and bev Pick n Pay 
Investigation concerns raised with 4 major supermarket 
retailers WRT  
Reputational 
damage - 
    SHP Yes   Shoprite/Checkers Barriers to entry and high profit margins, Namely: 
Poor Public 
perception 
    WHL Yes   Woolworths 1. Exclusive lease agreements   
    SPP Yes   Spar 2. Information exchange   
    MSM Yes   Massmart 3. Abuse of power - exclusive price    
      No   Metcash 
4. Category management - Product payment promotion 
and price    
                
21 1-Feb-11 AEG Yes Construction  Aveng 
"Fast track settlement" - reduced administrative 
penalty.  
No. of 
contraventions 
    MUR Yes   
Murray and 
Roberts 
Group 5 assisting the commission from 2009 - 
applications for leniency received from Size of bid etc. 
            Grinaker-LTA and Murray and Roberts (CLP).    
                
22 7-Feb-11   No 
Steel/Constr
uction  
SA Metal and 
Machinery (SAM) 
Scrap metal merchants to face collusion charges. 
Dividing the  
10% of annual 
turnover 
      No   
National Scrap 
Metal 
market and fix trading conditions for ferrous and 
nonferrous materials   
      No   
Power metal 
recycling     
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Event 
no. Date  Ticker  Listed Industry Company Event Description  Fine value 
    
 
Info 
available         
23 28-Feb-11 SAS Yes 
Petro- 
chemical 
Sasol Chemical 
Industries 
Amended settlement agreement between the 
commission and Sasol. R 111 m 
            
Sasol admit to indirect price fixing and agrees to pay a 
penalty. 
3% of the 2009 
revenue 
            Case settled in December 2010 with Safripol   
24 16-Mar-11 LBH Yes 
Property 
Market 
Liberty Group 
Limited  
Retail property market was divided through two  deeds 
of restraint    
      No   
Win Twice 
Properties thereby allocation customers and territories    
                
25 2-Apr-12 ACL Yes 
Steel/Constr
uction  
Acer Mittal South 
Africa LTD 
Price fixing and market allocation conduct for flat steel 
products 
10% of annual 
turnover 
      No   Highveld Steel     
      No   
Vanadium 
Corporation LTD     
                
26 22-Jul-13 AEG Yes Construction  AVENG  
Consent agreements reached with the Competition 
Commission for all construction companies. R 306,576,143.00 
    MUR Yes   
Murray and 
Roberts  
 
  
    WBO Yes   WBHO    
    GRF Yes   Group 5     
    SSK Yes   Steffanutti Stocks     
    RBX Yes   Raubex     
    BSR Yes   Basil Read     
    ESR Yes   Esor     
        
Table 10: Event dates 
